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A commercial DVB-H mobile TV spectrum licence was awarded to Digita Oy in Finland in 
March 2006. One year later, the network infrastructure is operational but there are no service 
operators or DVB-H enabled handsets available to the public. One possible reason for the cur-
rent situation is the uncertainty concerning best business models for both mobile operators and 
broadcasters. This uncertainty surrounding the future of the DVB-H business sparked the mo-
tivation and interest for conducting this study. The purpose of this study is to identify plausi-
ble DVB-H mobile TV business models, and to evaluate and rank such models according to 
their economic performance prospects. We chose techno-economic analysis as the research 
method, and constructed a quantitative model of the DVB-H mobile TV business ecosystem, 
enabling the evaluation of potential cash flows with different parameters. We collected data 
for the modelling through conducting a literature review as well as a comprehensive set of 
interviews with leading industry experts. 
The results of the techno-economic analysis support the dominant expectations of the inter-
viewed experts. DVB-H mobile TV services are not likely to become a major source of reve-
nues, let alone the next ‘killer application’, for mobile operators or broadcasters in Finland. 
This study indicates that the least risky and easiest-to-implement business model for a mobile 
operator appears to be co-operating with broadcasters to bring the new services to market. 
According to the proposed business model, broadcasters would take care of attaining the re-
quired DVB-H network capacity as well as provide the programming, whilst mobile operators
would take care of the sales and marketing of the new services to consumers. Yet the foremost 
value creation potential for mobile operators and broadcasters appears to be in also perform-
ing the other party’s role (a mobile operator becoming a DVB-H broadcaster, or a broadcaster 
selling DVB-H services directly to consumers, bypassing mobile operators). These models
are, however, also associated with considerably higher risks. To conclude, the results of this 
study indicate a conflict of interests between the two key parties regarding the sharing of costs 
and potential revenues. 
Mobile operators, broadcasters, and other parties interested in DVB-H mobile TV business, 
can use the results of this study for reference and comparison with their own calculations.
More importantly, the results can provide avenues for new discussions between the parties. In 
addition, this study paves ground for further research on potential business models concerning 
the commercialisation of the DVB-H mobile TV service technology. 
Keywords: DVB-H, mobile television, techno-economic analysis, business model. 
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Kaupallinen DVB-H-tekniikkaan perustuva, matkaviestimillä vastaanotettaville digitaalisille 
joukkoviestintäpalveluille (DVB-H-mobiilitelevisio) tarkoitettu verkkotoimilupa myönnettiin 
Digita Oy:lle Suomessa maaliskuussa 2006. Vuotta myöhemmin verkko on toiminnassa, mut-
ta Suomessa ei toimi palveluoperaattoreita eikä yleisölle ole myynnissä DVB-H-
vastaanottimia. Yksi mahdollinen syy nykytilanteeseen on parhaisiin liiketoimintamalleihin 
liittyvä epävarmuus matkaviestinoperaattoreiden ja TV-yhtiöiden kannalta. Tämä DVB-H-
liiketoiminnan tulevaisuutta koskeva epävarmuus synnytti motivaation ja kiinnostuksen tämän 
tutkimuksen tekemiseen. Tämän tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on tunnistaa DVB-H-
mobiilitelevision todennäköiset liiketoimintamallit ja järjestää ne taloudellisen suorituskyvyn 
mukaan. Valitsimme tutkimusmenetelmäksi teknis-taloudellisen analyysin, ja rakensimme
DVB-H-mobiilitelevision liiketoimintaekosysteemistä kvantitatiivisen mallin, joka mahdollis-
taa potentiaalisten kassavirtojen arvioinnin eri parametrein. Keräsimme lähtötiedot mallia var-
ten kirjallisuuskatsauksella sekä haastattelemalla kattavan määrän alan johtavia asiantuntijoi-
ta. 
Teknis-taloudellisen analyysin tulokset tukevat haastateltujen asiantuntijoiden vallitsevia odo-
tuksia: DVB-H-palvelut eivät todennäköisesti tule olemaan suuri tulonlähde tai seuraava ”tap-
pajasovellus” matkaviestinoperaattoreille tai TV-yhtiöille Suomessa. Tulosten mukaan mat-
kaviestinoperaattorin kannalta riskittömin liiketoimintamalli olisi yhteistoiminta TV-yhtiöiden 
kanssa palvelujen tuomiseksi markkinoille. Tässä mallissa TV-yhtiöt hankkisivat lähetyskapa-
siteetin ja ohjelmistosisällön, ja matkaviestinoperaattori hoitaisi palvelujen myynnin ja mark-
kinoinnin kuluttajille. Kuitenkin suurin potentiaali arvon luomiselle sekä matkaviestinoperaat-
torin että TV-yhtiön kannalta näyttäisi olevan toistensa roolin omaksumisessa (matkavies-
tinoperaattorista tulisi DVB-H-TV-yhtiö, tai TV-yhtiö myisi DVB-H-palveluja suoraan kulut-
tajille ohittaen matkaviestinoperaattorit). Näihin malleihin kuitenkin liittyy myös huomatta-
vasti korkeammat riskit. Yhteenvetona tulokset näyttävät intressiristiriidan näiden kahden 
avainosapuolen välillä liittyen kustannusten ja mahdollisten tuottojen jakamiseen. 
Matkaviestinoperaattorit, TV-yhtiöt ja muut DVB-H-mobiilitelevisiosta kiinnostuneet osapuo-
let voivat käyttää tämän tutkimuksen tuloksia vertailukohtana omille tutkimuksilleen. Mikä 
tärkeämpää, tulokset voivat mahdollistaa uusia keskusteluja osapuolten välillä. Lisäksi tämä 
diplomityö pohjustaa jatkotutkimuksia DVB-H-tekniikan kaupallistamisen liiketoimintamal-
leihin. 
Avainsanat: DVB-H, mobiilitelevisio, teknis-taloudellinen analyysi, liiketoimintamalli. 
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Key concepts 
 
Broadcasting is a means of communication, especially the transmission of TV 
and radio programmes to all viewers or listeners in the network coverage area, as 
opposed to unicasting, which is the transmission of information separately to an 
individual viewer. 
Channel is a portion of a frequency spectrum that is set aside for a specific pur-
pose, for example, the broadcasting of a television or radio signal.  
DVB-H is a version of the European digital terrestrial television standard DVB-
T, enhanced for mobile handheld reception. 
IP Datacast over DVB-H (IPDC/DVB-H) is an Internet Protocol enabled end-to-
end broadcast system for the delivery of digital services to mobile handheld de-
vices. The system uses a unidirectional broadcast path and can be combined with 
a bi-directional return path. 
Mobile TV is television service for mobile devices using either a terrestrial or 
satellite broadcast network, or a cellular (mobile) network as the transmission 
method. 
Multiplex is a set of digital TV and radio services that are mixed together into 
one broadcast signal. Multiplex transmission allows the reception of multiple ser-
vices on a single frequency range. 
Techno-economics is a branch of science focusing on the economics of new 
technologies and business models. 
Smartphone is a mobile phone, which runs a commercial operating system (such 
as Symbian, Windows Mobile, Linux, or OS X) and allows installing additional 
native applications. 
Simulcasting is the simultaneous transmission of the same television or radio 
signal or programme over two or more separate transmission networks. 
Single Frequency Network (SFN) is a regional broadcasting network, in which 
several transmitters broadcast the same signal using the same frequency channel. 
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Abbreviations 
 
16QAM 16-state Quadrature Amplitude Modulation 
3G Third-generation (mobile phone technology) 
CMLA Content Management Licence Administrator 
COIN Dynamics of COmpetition and INnovation in the converging 
Internet and mobile networks.  
DAB Digital Audio Broadcasting 
DCF Discounted Cash Flow 
DVB-H Digital Video Broadcasting Handheld 
DVB-T Digital Video Broadcasting Terrestrial. 
ECOSYS Techno-ECOnomics of integrated communication SYStems 
and services. 
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications 
IPDC IP Datacast, Internet Protocol Datacast.  
IPDC/DVB-H Internet Protocol Datacast over Digital Video Broadcasting  
Handheld 
MMS Multimedia Messaging Service 
NPV Net Present Value 
OFDM Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing 
S-DMB Satellite Digital Multimedia Broadcasting 
SFN Single Frequency Network. 
SMP Significant Market Power 
SMS Short Message Service 
T-DMB Terrestrial Digital Multimedia Broadcasting 
TV Television 
WCDMA Wideband Code Division Multiple Access 
WTP Willingness to pay 
YLE Yleisradio Oy. Finnish Broadcasting Company. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
On 23 March 2006, following a beauty contest, Finnish government awarded a 
commercial DVB-H spectrum licence to Digita Oy, a broadcast network operator. 
This 20-year licence permits Digita to build and operate a new network based on 
DVB-H technology. The DVB-H standard has been designed for distributing 
digital broadcast mobile TV services.  
Mobile TV, made possible by the convergence of media and telecommunications 
industries as well as the convergence in consumer electronics, was one of the 
most hyped new mobile services in Europe in 2006 (Gartner, Inc. 2006). The ad-
vertised key features of mobile TV are personalisation, interactivity, and most 
importantly, ‘placeshifting’, i.e., the ability to watch ones favourite TV pro-
gramming while on the go. 
DVB-H technology has been strongly pushed in Europe by the mobile phone 
manufacturer Nokia. Italy and Finland are so far the only European countries 
with live DVB-H networks, but others are expected to follow suit as soon as 
spectrum becomes available. 
In Finland, Digita proceeded to launch its DVB-H network in the capital region 
and in the cities of Turku and Oulu on 1 December 2006, although there were no 
handsets available to the public. The initial population coverage of the network 
was approximately 25%, and Digita has agreed to expand it to at least 40% by the 
end of 2007.  
However, even now that the network is operational in Finland, there remains un-
certainty concerning the shape of the emerging mobile TV business ecosystem 
and the business models that will create the most value for service operators. This 
uncertainty sparked the motivation and interest for conducting this study, as we 
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perceive the industry’s ability to construct a viable business ecosystem around 
mobile TV as a key factor in delivering compelling services to the consumers.  
In this thesis, we evaluate the DVB-H mobile TV service business case in Finland 
by applying a techno-economic modelling approach, supported by expert inter-
views and a literature review. By analysing different business models in simu-
lated market conditions, we aim to identify and quantify new cash flows poten-
tially generated by mobile TV services. We can then rank the different business 
models according to their economic performance. The analysis process also en-
ables us to test the applicability of the chosen techno-economic methodology in 
such context.  
This thesis is a part of a two-year national research project, Dynamics of COmpe-
tition and INnovation in the Converging Internet and Mobile Networks (COIN)1, 
in which the Networking Laboratory of Helsinki University of Technology 
(TKK) is participating along with a number of leading industry partners. 
1.2 Research problem  
The uncertainty surrounding the emerging mobile TV business ecosystem and 
business models creates the research problem that this thesis aims to address: 
“Which service operator business models would create the most value in simu-
lated market conditions, and which factors affect the value the most?”  
We regard the significance of the research problem as notable and topical, since 
there are not many public studies focusing on the service side of mobile TV, and 
practically none dealing with Finland. Moreover, mobile service operators and 
broadcasters have been quite silent about their plans for service operations, per-
haps partly because of ongoing copyright negotiations, but also potentially be-
cause of the uncertainties regarding the best business models. 
Our study then provides a public and impartial assessment of the business case, 
enabling further, perhaps more delicate studies on the various aspects of the busi-
ness ecosystem and business models. Moreover, our study can also enable new 
discussions between different parties. 
                                                 
1 COIN project website: http://www.netlab.tkk.fi/tutkimus/coin/ 
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Through conducting the business case analysis, we can also evaluate the applica-
bility of the used techno-economic methodology in addressing such a problem. 
1.3 Objectives of thesis 
The primary objective of this thesis is to  
• construct a techno-economic model of DVB-H broadcast mobile TV ser-
vice business ecosystem in Finland,  
• identify plausible DVB-H mobile TV business models for mobile operators 
and broadcasters, and  
• evaluate and rank such business models according to their economic per-
formance prospects.  
The secondary objective of this thesis is to gain more understanding of the tech-
nical, economic, and regulative issues involved in the DVB-H service business, 
and to develop further the means of conducting a techno-economic analysis of a 
service business case. 
1.4 Scope of research 
We restrict the scope of research with the following three limitations. First, we 
limit the scope of research regionally to Finland. This implies that we study the 
Finnish mobile TV service industry, regulation, and market conditions. Related 
EU regulation is included in the scope as well. Other regions and markets are out 
of the scope. 
Second, we limit the scope to the actors directly or closely related with the ser-
vice operation. This means that we study mainly mobile operators and broadcast-
ers, and to some degree content provision and broadcast network operation. Infra-
structure vendors, application vendors, and such are out of the scope. 
Third, we limit the scope to mobile phones as the service reception device, 
IPDC/DVB-H as the broadcast network technology, and GPRS/WCDMA as the 
return path technology. Other technical implementations, e.g. DAB-based net-
works or WLAN return path, are out of the scope. 
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1.5 Research methods 
The research methods used in this study are literature review, semi-structured ex-
pert interviews, and techno-economic analysis. 
In the literature review, we address the business, regulative, and technical issues 
concerning mobile TV. There are not many specific literature sources covering 
the mobile TV business models, as the first commercial mobile TV networks 
have only recently launched around the world. We therefore apply general eco-
nomic theory about the sales of information goods as well as findings from mo-
bile service usage studies and mobile TV pilot studies.  
For regulative information, we resort primarily to information from Ministry of 
Transport and Communications, and Finnish Communications Regulative Au-
thority (FICORA). We cover also related law, especially the Communications 
Market Act of 2003 and its amendments. 
In the semi-structured interviews, we gather expert opinions from different sides 
of the ecosystem. The interview questions address the emerging services, busi-
ness models, and revenue sharing. The interviewees come from, in alphabetical 
order, Digi TV Plus Oy, Digita Oy, Elisa Oyj, MTV Interactive Oy, Nokia Oyj, 
SWelcom Oy, Telecommunications Software and Multimedia Laboratory of Hel-
sinki University of Technology (TKK), and TeliaSonera Oyj. By a common wish 
we list the interviewed experts at the end of the thesis but do not quote them by 
name or company, as the opinions of the interviewees are personal and do not 
necessarily present those of their employers. 
For the techno-economic analysis, we use a Microsoft Excel based ECOSYS tool. 
The tool and analysis methodology by the same name have been developed in 
several consecutive EU research projects. We base the scenarios and other inputs 
for the techno-economic model on the literature review, the expert interviews, 
and our prior knowledge of networking business. 
1.6 Structure of thesis 
We organise this thesis in chapters so that we begin by presenting the techno-
economic methodology in chapter two. The chapter discusses the inputs and out-
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puts of techno-economic analysis, and its strengths and weaknesses. The chapter 
also presents the ECOSYS tool used in this study. 
In chapter three, we describe the construction of the actual techno-economic 
model of the mobile TV service business case in detail. The chapter includes a 
presentation of the generic business ecosystem of mobile TV in Finland, and the 
various service operator models we study, as well as a systematic description of 
different factors and assumptions in the model. 
In chapter four, we present the numeric results of the techno-economic analysis. 
The chapter includes the value of the business case for different types of service 
operators and different business models, as well as a sensitivity analysis to iden-
tify which factors affect the value the most. 
In chapter five, we sum up our findings and draw conclusions of the business 
case. The chapter includes an interpretation and assessment of the results, as well 
as evaluation of reliability and validity of the study. The chapter also discusses 
possible exploitation of results and recommends items for future research. 
In chapter six, we discuss the relationship between WCDMA streaming mobile 
TV and DVB-H mobile TV, as well as the general outlook of DVB-H services in 
Finland and on a global scale. 
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2 Overview of techno-economic methodology 
In this chapter, we give an overview of the techno-economic research methodol-
ogy we use in this thesis. We describe the analysis inputs and outputs, discuss the 
interpretation of the outputs, and present the ECOSYS tool that we use for the 
quantitative analysis.  
2.1 Techno-economic analysis 
Techno-economics is a branch of science that focuses on analysing the economic 
aspects of new technologies or innovations and associated business models. Ac-
cording to Hull, Walsh, Green, and McMeekin (1999), Techno-economic study 
can involve the examination and description of dynamic relationships amongst 
various actors, and flow of intermediaries (money, contracts, etc.) required for the 
progress of a specific innovation (techno-economic networks), as well as long-
term fluctuations in economic growth and links with technical change (techno-
economic paradigms). Techno-economics thus allows the adoption of an analytic 
framework which is neither totally micro and case-study based, nor totally macro 
and policy-oriented.  
For the purposes of this thesis, we can define techno-economic analysis as a 
quantitative analysis seeking to determine the economic feasibility of innovations 
and new services in a certain market setting, as well as a qualitative analysis for 
identifying and describing the required business roles and interactions. 
Much of the terminology and methodology we use in this thesis has been devel-
oped during the last 16 years under the framework programmes of the European 
Union. The original methodology was introduced under the first framework pro-
gramme for communications research, RACE I2. The work has continued under 
                                                 
2 Research for Advanced Communications in Europe 
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successive programmes, and is currently taking place under the ECOSYS re-
search project. 
The first methodology and accompanying analysis tool was SYNTHESYS, a 
simple geometric model for quantifying duct and cable lengths. The second 
methodology, TITAN, could be used to predict the cost evolution of network 
components based on a combination of learning curves and logistic functions. 
Later versions, OPTIMUM, TERA, and TONIC, have further enhanced the 
methodology to be able to cope with complex multimedia service and network 
structures. The most recent version, ECOSYS, brings improvements especially in 
the assessment of operational expenditures. (Olsen 1999, Lähteenoja et al. 2006) 
The methodology and approach has been used in practice by several telecommu-
nication operators in Europe, including e.g. Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom, 
Telenor, and KPN. (Lähteenoja et al. 2006) 
2.2 Elements of business case study 
Defining a business case for examination with the ECOSYS tool requires model-
ling the incoming and outgoing cash flows on a yearly basis. Identifying and 
quantifying these cash flows, namely revenues and costs, is a key challenge in 
modelling a business case accurately, since the calculation and final numeric re-
sults will be based on them. 
2.2.1 Study procedure 
The basic procedure for conducting a business case study using the ECOSYS 
methodology is the following: 
1. Make a survey of necessary applications and future needs. 
2. Translate the future needs into relevant services and/or architectures. 
3. Evaluate the services and/or architectures with the tool. 
4. Interpret the tool’s economic output and draw conclusions. 
(Bouillon et al. 2002) 
The analysis procedure then requires input data of the technology being examined 
as well as the implementation environment. A given technology can have for ex-
ample certain quantifiable service capabilities as well as monetary costs associ-
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ated with set-up, operations, and maintenance. The implementation environment 
can cover for instance the geographic, demographic, competitive, and regulative 
aspects, which in turn can affect the scope and costs of the implementation.  
2.2.2 Concepts and frameworks 
To construct a business case, we can utilise the concepts and frameworks of busi-
ness models, value chains, value networks, and business ecosystems for analysing 
the complex interactions between different players. 
Business models 
We can find various definitions for the term business model in the literature. For 
the purposes of this thesis, we apply the work of Lähteenoja et al. (2006) and de-
fine business model as follows: the set of roles in a value network a certain busi-
ness player chooses to perform, the relationships it has with other players, and its 
cost structure and sources of revenue. 
Value chains and value networks 
Porter’s (1985) value chain framework describes how an industrial organisation 
buys raw materials and transforms them into physical products. The process con-
sists of distinct value-adding activities with cost and value drivers. The purpose 
of the framework is to identify ways to maximise value creation and minimise 
costs. 
In a converging industry setting, such as mobile TV, traditional company-specific 
value chains may no longer adequately reflect the complex reality. Alongside 
Porter’s value chain framework, which focuses on cost minimisation and compe-
tition, we can use the value network approach, which better acknowledges the ex-
istence of collaboration between different players. 
We apply the view of value networks as proposed by Smura (2006). He cites Li 
& Whalley (2002) writing that “A value network can be seen as a series of inter-
twined value chains where some nodes are simultaneously involved in more than 
one value chain”. As a requirement for a successful value network, Smura also 
highlights the importance of providing a whole product, defined by Moore G. A. 
(1991) as the “Minimum set of products and services needed to fulfil the compel-
ling reason to buy for the target customer”. In the case of mobile services, this 
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means that several parallel value chains in the mobile value network must be in 
place to deliver value to the customers, as shown in Figure 1 below. 
Customers
Customer
segment
Networks Terminals Applications 
+ Content
Components
Service
operator
Network
operator
Network
vendor
Terminal
retailer
Terminal
vendor
Content
aggregator
Content
provider
Content
owner
Component
vendor
 
Figure 1: Simplified mobile value network (Smura 2006). 
Business ecosystems 
Moore J. F. (1993, 1996) writes that a company should be viewed not as a mere 
member of a single industry, but as a part of a business ecosystem, an economic 
community of interacting organisations evolving around an innovation and cross-
ing a variety of industries to produce goods and services to end customers. The 
community can consist of suppliers, lead producers, competitors, and other stake-
holders working co-operatively and competitively. The members of the commu-
nity co-evolve their capabilities and roles over time, and tend to align themselves 
and their investments with the directions and shared visions set by one or more 
‘leadership’ companies.  
According to Moore J. F. (1993), the birth of a business ecosystem consists of 
three essential stages that entrepreneurs or companies have to go through success-
fully:  
1. Betting on a seed innovation that can lead to revolutionary products. 
2. Discovering the right customer value proposition. 
3. Designing a business that can serve the potential market. 
After its birth, a business ecosystem faces competition from both inside and out-
side the community. It has to cope with challenges arising from expansion, lead-
ership struggles, and self-renewal to fight other ecosystems. 
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In our view, Moore’s business ecosystem theory is a good starting point for ana-
lysing the new business environment emerging around mobile TV, which con-
nects together companies from two different industries: broadcast media and mo-
bile communications. Unlike static value chains and business models, business 
ecosystem theory acknowledges the evolution of different players and the roles 
they perform over time.  
We apply the business ecosystem concept to analyse the central roles in mobile 
TV service delivery, and to see which role and business model arrangements 
could create most value for both mobile operators and broadcasters. 
2.2.3 Scenario approach 
In this thesis, we adopt a guideline framework proposed by Ravera et al. (1998) 
for techno-economic modelling of telecommunications networks. The framework 
uses input scenarios to analyse the environment.  
Ravera et al. define a scenario as a “Description of a network environment… in 
which there is provided a set of services to a number of users within a certain area 
and timeframe. It includes both a starting situation and a target for the network 
and services evolution.”  
To limit the inherent complexity, Ravera et al. decompose a full scenario into 
four categorised (sub-) scenarios. The four categories are the following: 
1. Regulation/competition,  
2. technology,  
3. environment, and  
4. service. 
A regulation/competition scenario describes how the market is regulated for in-
stance in terms of possible decoupling of service and network operation, tariff 
structures, significant market power, and operator revenues. The scenario also de-
scribes the state of competition through for instance the market shares of different 
network and service operators. 
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A technology scenario describes the technologies, systems, and architectures 
needed to provide the services. It holds the current and future network architec-
ture, and the associated operational and capital expenditures. 
An environment scenario describes the current and future status of network infra-
structure, and the geography and demographics of the market. It thus holds for in-
stance the division of the geographic area into different classes by the population 
density. 
A service scenario describes the services and applications provided by the service 
operators. It holds the different service types, the current and future penetration of 
the service types, and the subscription tariffs. For the purposes of this thesis, we 
include also the different business models and the associated operational expendi-
ture in the service scenario. 
2.3 ECOSYS tool 
The ECOSYS tool is an integral part of the chosen techno-economic methodol-
ogy approach for evaluating a business case. The MS Excel based tool has been 
developed for calculating the value, profitability, and other financial indices for 
telecommunications architecture related business cases. It enables a structured 
and consistent method of performing a cash flow analysis.  
2.3.1 Tool and calculation overview 
ECOSYS tool takes a bottom-up approach in evaluating the economic feasibility 
of a network or service implementation. This means that it sums up small pieces 
to generate aggregate cash flows. These pieces are for instance the service spend-
ing by consumers and network element specific costs. 
User first enters the input data into a financial model based on which the tool then 
calculates the total revenues, investments, cash flows, and profits for each year 
for the chosen study period. The output of the model includes key financial indi-
ces meant for decision-making. 
Figure 2 below gives an overview of the ECOSYS methodology and the elements 
in the tool. Game theory and real options are alternative strategic and financial 
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methods, which can be included in the tool, but we do not employ them in this 
thesis. 
Year n
…
Year 2
Year 1
Revenues
Investments
Cash flows
Profits
Financial model
Cost evolution
OA&M class
Volume class
Component database
Services
Architectures
Radio model
Decision index
calculation
NPV, IRR, 
payback period
Market size + Tariffs 
+ Policy
Real options
User inputs
Operators
Surveys
Operators
Suppliers
Standardisation
body
Other
Game 
theory
 
Figure 2: Calculation elements in the ECOSYS tool (Lähteenoja et al. 2006). 
2.3.2 Calculation steps and inputs 
The following steps need to be taken for completing a techno-economic evalua-
tion in the ECOSYS tool: setting a study period, defining a set of services, defin-
ing network architecture, defining OA&M costs, defining economic and other pa-
rameters, and running simulations on the model. 
Setting a study period 
User defines the study period in years so that it best suites to the business case. 
What is a reasonable period depends on the economic life of the required invest-
ments, which in turn depend on the type and size of network being deployed.  
Defining a set of services 
User defines the set of services included in the project. A service is an abstract 
element that has a specific connection and usage tariff, a potential market size 
and a market penetration over the study period. These can be projected using 
built-in formulas or input by hand. ECOSYS combines the annual potential mar-
ket size, annual market penetration, and annual tariff information to calculate the 
revenues for the services. 
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Defining a network architecture 
User defines the network architecture setting for the network. For cable networks, 
ECOSYS uses a geometric model for calculating cable and duct lengths. In case 
of radio networks, such as DVB-H, no geometric model is needed. Resulting 
from the architecture setting is the ‘shopping list’, i.e., the installed base of 
equipment over time. From the installation schedule and cost prices for each 
component, ECOSYS calculates the annual capital expenditure (CAPEX) and as-
sociated depreciation over the study period.  
Defining OPEX 
OPEX stands for operational expenditure, i.e., the on-going costs for running a 
business. It includes all costs associated with the business case except the capital 
expenditure. Kaleelazhicathu et al. (2005) have identified the following OPEX 
categories commonly present in telecom operator business:  
• Maintenance of equipment and components 
• Equipment and software licences, maintenance outsourcing 
• Sales and marketing, customer acquisition 
• Customer provisioning 
• Customer care 
• Charging and billing 
• Service management 
• Network management 
• Product/platform development 
• Rental of physical network resources 
• Roaming 
• Interconnection 
• Yearly cost of radio spectrum licences 
• Regulation 
• Content 
Defining economic and other parameters 
Project specific economic inputs such as discount rate, period of tax deductibility 
of losses, and tax rate must be input. These inputs affect the way the annual cash 
flows are handled. The discount rate depends on the risk level of the project and 
the average cost of capital of the company, and the tax policy varies by country. 
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OPEX and CAPEX are generally treated equally in a cash flow analysis. The dis-
tinction of OPEX and CAPEX elements becomes important only when we con-
sider corporate taxes on profits. A business can deduct all of its annual OPEX 
items from revenues, but of CAPEX items, it can deduct only the annual depre-
ciation. The corporate taxes matter only when the operator has any profits to pay 
taxes on. 
Other parameters can be for example the network construction speed or percent-
age of people preferring a bundled handset. User can define virtually unlimited 
amount of custom parameters to be included in the calculation. 
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2.3.3 Economic outputs 
ECOSYS tool combines the annual service revenues, investments (CAPEX), op-
erational expenditure (OPEX), and economic parameters to calculate several fi-
nancial indices and other results for the study period. The calculated financial in-
dices are:  
• Net present value (NPV),  
• internal rate of return (IRR), 
• rest value,  
• payback period,  
• NPV before taxes, and 
• IRR before taxes. 
Other results calculated for each year in the study period are: 
• Investments,  
• cost prices (price curves),  
• running costs,  
• maintenance,  
• revenues,  
• cash flows,  
• depreciation,  
• profits,  
• taxable income,  
• taxes,  
• retained cash flow,  
• cash balance,  
• earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA),  
• earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT),  
• interest, and 
• earnings before taxes. 
2.4 Interpretation of results and sensitivity analysis 
The basic output of a techno-economic analysis is the economic profitability of 
the examined business case. The profitability calculations are most often based on 
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cash flow analysis, which either sums up annual net cash flows as such or as dis-
counted to the beginning of the study period taking into account the project’s risk 
and time value of money.  
Cash flow analysis of a project is based on an incremental approach, in which 
only the costs and revenues directly related to the evaluated project are consid-
ered, i.e., the cash flows that will materialise only if the project is undertaken and 
vice versa. For instance, a company’s general overhead costs should not be calcu-
lated if they are not directly caused by the project, although in accounting it 
would be justified to distribute them evenly to all projects. (Brealey et al. 2006, 
pp. 114-116)  
The most typical cash flow based calculation methods are net present value 
(NPV), internal rate of return (IRR), and payback time. Each of these methods 
has its own set of strengths and weaknesses, but NPV is generally considered the 
most consistent and elegant of them. (Brealey et al. 2006, pp. 85-99)  
In this thesis, we use NPV to rank different operating models against each other. 
NPV uses a discounted cash flow (DCF) approach. The interpretation of an NPV 
result goes so that if the outcome is negative, a company would destroy value by 
investing in the project, and if the outcome is positive, the company would create 
value by investing in the project. In other words, a company should only under-
take a project that has a positive NPV. 
The drawback of using this kind of plain DCF approach is that it assumes that the 
project is held passively, neglecting the effect of management. In real world, un-
dertaking a project with negative NPV can be justified, if it is e.g. a strategic pro-
ject enabling further projects. Similarly, deciding not to undertake projects with a 
positive NPV is also justified, if waiting enables even higher returns. Manage-
ment also has the option to abandon or expand the project early on if it turns out 
worse or better than expected. Such effects are invisible in regular DCF valuation 
(which we use in this thesis), but could be captured by using real option valuation 
(ROV) approach. (Brealey et al. 2006, pp. 597-610) 
A cash flow analysis is often built upon numerous assumptions and uncertain 
variables. The underlying uncertainty can be interpreted as the risk in the project. 
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Sources of risk can be e.g. market demand, competition, regulation, technology, 
operations, investments, and so forth. A single NPV value can then indicate only 
one possible result from the set of all different outcomes. Therefore, it is valuable 
to conduct a sensitivity analysis to get a view of the variability of the outcome 
and the overall risk of the project. 
Sensitivity analysis means studying how the variation in the output of the model 
can be apportioned to different sources of variation. It can be used to identify 
which variables contribute the most in the output’s variability. 
A traditional sensitivity analysis examines the effect of changing one input pa-
rameter at a time to identify the most significant variables. However, this is not 
sufficient if a more complete picture of the overall uncertainty is needed. (El-
negaard and Stordahl 2004) 
In this thesis, we utilise a multivariable sensitivity analysis, based on a Monte 
Carlo simulation. To do this, we use the Crystal Ball™ software with Monte 
Carlo simulation and statistical analysis capabilities on top of the ECOSYS 
model to perform automatically a large number of simulation runs and collect sta-
tistical data. Monte Carlo simulation is a widely used stochastic computational 
algorithm for simulating the behaviour of various complex physical or mathe-
matical systems.  
Compared to a stand-alone spreadsheet calculation model providing only a single 
result at a time based on e.g. the expected values of parameters, a model using 
Monte Carlo simulation can randomly generate thousands of values for each un-
certain variable. The simulation engine pseudo-randomly selects a value from a 
defined range and shape of distribution for every variable and then recalculates 
the spreadsheet. By doing this repeatedly and by storing the results for later 
analysis, the engine simulates the model’s behaviour with numerous different 
combinations of parameter values.  
The main benefit is that a sensitivity analysis done with Monte Carlo simulation 
can tell us what is probable, whereas traditional sensitivity analysis can only tell 
us what is possible (Elnegaard and Stordahl 2004). Monte Carlo simulation then 
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helps us to analyse the effects of simultaneous changes in different parameter 
values and to estimate the expected and extreme values of the business case.  
However, even after a sensitivity analysis, the obtained numerical results must 
not be seen as universal outcomes for the real value of the business case. Instead, 
they represent the possible values of the business case in simulated market condi-
tions with a number of underlying assumptions. Moreover, if the calculation 
model and parameter ranges do not reflect reality, the simulation outputs will not 
do it either. 
2.5 Shortcomings of methodology 
Majority of uncertainty is potentially built in a techno-economic analysis when 
different cash flows are projected over long periods using a number of assump-
tions and variables, since predictions about the future are by definition uncertain. 
In many cases, these assumptions and variables concerning uncertain future 
events must be estimated based on e.g. expert opinions or best guesses, rather 
than on solid scientific facts. It is then clear that the analysis output is at best only 
as good as the input data, even when the calculation logic itself would accurately 
imitate reality. The same however applies to any method of forecasting future 
cash flows. ECOSYS mitigates this problem by making the assumptions explicit. 
This uncertainty can be limited to a certain degree by using several sources of in-
formation for each parameter whenever possible. This, accompanied by making 
each assumption explicit, helps to improve the transparency of the calculations, 
which in turn helps to improve the results’ usefulness in practice. 
Moreover, the simulations rely on approximations and simplifications, but the 
model can output results at the accuracy of single euros. This can create an illu-
sion of accuracy, although the starting values can be in the scale of thousands or 
millions of euros. To overcome this illusion in this thesis, we report all results 
with accuracy in proportion to the starting values. 
Finally, the methodology is not optimal for studying the effects of changes in 
socio-economic factors or changes in consumer needs and desires. The overall 
cultural context in which the techno-economic mechanisms are situated can also 
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have a great effect on technological change, as discussed by Stein (1995). Capa-
bility to model such factors consistently could prove useful in studying the adop-
tion of content service innovations such as mobile TV. However, this is not an ac-
tual shortcoming of the methodology, since ECOSYS has not been designed for 
such analysis. In this thesis, we try to incorporate such effects in market demand 
forecasts. 
2.6 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, we have covered the techno-economic analysis as research meth-
odology through listing the different elements in the analysis from inputs and 
outputs to the interpretation of results. We have also highlighted the shortcomings 
of the methodology. 
We have discussed various concepts and frameworks for studying business cases: 
business models, value chains, value networks, and business ecosystems. We 
have also introduced a scenario-based approach to organising and modelling the 
regulative, technical, service-related, and environmental considerations of the 
business case. 
Most importantly, we have presented the ECOSYS tool and its operation. We 
have gone through the concrete steps required to build a model of a network 
business case and listed the financial outputs of the tool. We have also introduced 
the Monte Carlo simulation approach we use for sensitivity analysis. 
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3 Techno-economics of IPDC/DVB-H services 
In this chapter, we describe the elements and assumptions we use to construct the 
techno-economic ECOSYS model for the IPDC/DVB-H mobile TV service in 
Finland. We first define the study period, and then proceed to cover the business 
case circumstances thoroughly using the scenario framework of regula-
tion/competition, technology, service, and environment scenarios. 
We build the techno-economic calculation model from a service operator per-
spective. The focus is therefore on the potential market size, market demand, and 
service revenues rather than technical implementation or network architecture. 
Consequently, we use the ECOSYS tool for a rather different kind of business 
case than the ones the tool has primarily been designed for. The modelling chal-
lenge thus also tests the applicability of the methodology for evaluating new mo-
bile services and related ecosystems. 
3.1 Study period and economic parameters 
The business case of broadcast mobile TV has many moving parts. Therefore, we 
want to have a study period that is reasonable for making penetration forecasts, 
but also one that enables making practical conclusions about the profitability of 
the business case. We then choose to have a study period of roughly five years, 
from April 2007 to end of 2011.  
We believe that five years is a long enough time for a mobile service to catch 
momentum if it ever will. However, this does not mean that the service should 
reach its peak usage during the first five years. At the outset, we can expect that 
in five years time mobile TV can be an every-day mobile service for many con-
sumers, a slowly advancing niche application, or a nearly forgotten failed ven-
ture. We can also expect that during five years, new technology hypes will be in-
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troduced and potentially be attracting the limited focus and resources of the mo-
bile industry. 
Then again, even five years is a rather long time for making meaningful forecasts 
about mobile services, especially with starting data as scarce as with mobile TV 
in Finland. 
Corporate tax for profits in Finland is 26%. We set the cash flow discount rate for 
the business case to 8% for all operator types and business models. The discount 
rate is roughly based on after-tax weighted average cost of capital (WACC) rates 
we estimated for two major telecommunications operators in Finland. It is rea-
sonable to argue that using the same discount rate for all business models and op-
erator types is not optimal, since the level of risk can vary between them. How-
ever, estimating the risk level separately for each business model and converting 
it to discount rate would not be without problems either. Therefore, we choose to 
use a constant rate and consider the varying risk level when interpreting the re-
sults.  
3.2 Mobile TV business ecosystem in Finland 
To model the business ecosystem emerging around DVB-H mobile TV, we can 
begin by looking at the value chains of mass media and mobile content business. 
We cover these two briefly before presenting the business ecosystem we use in 
this study. 
3.2.1 Value chain of traditional mass media 
Nieminen and Pantti (2004) have discussed the traditional value chain of mass 
media. According to them, the most common roles in the value chain are as fol-
lows: 
Content production Æ Aggregation Æ End-product packaging Æ Distribution Æ Reception 
In brief, the production phase includes the original creation of the content. Ag-
gregation is the sourcing of content from various producers. End-product packag-
ing is the offering of the content to the distributors or end users. Distribution is 
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the delivery of the content to the end users. Reception is the consumption of the 
content. 
Nieminen and Pantti (2004) write that the role of aggregators is central in the me-
dia business, because the aggregator often becomes the holder of the usage rights 
for the original production, and can therefore trade the rights further. 
For example, the TV channels in Finland may compete of the regional rights to 
show the best foreign TV series. In this case, the Finnish TV channel acts as an 
end-product packager and distributor. For some programming content, the Fin-
nish TV channel can be also the content producer and/or the content aggregator. 
Often the mass media field consists of a multitude of specialised players and a 
few large, vertically integrated players involved in everything before the recep-
tion. Different distribution technologies and digitalisation have further compli-
cated the picture, and horizontal integration across different media is common, 
leading to cross-media content provisioning under the same brand. 
Mass media production has five distinct sources of financing:  
1. consumers,  
2. advertisers,  
3. third parties,  
4. publishers, and  
5. public sector.  
Examples of consumers paying for the TV channels in Finland are on one hand 
the TV licence fees collected for the national broadcaster YLE, and on the other 
hand the subscription movie channels. The commercial channels financed by ad-
vertising do not collect direct consumer payments, but the consumer still pays 
their operations indirectly by buying products advertised on the channels. 
(Nieminen and Pantti 2004). 
TV viewing models 
The viewing models of television can be classified according to how they collect 
the money from consumers. The most important viewing model in Finland is cur-
rently the free-TV financed by licence fees or advertising. If the consumer has to 
pay directly for viewing, the model is called pay-TV. Pay-TV can be based on a 
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paid temporal subscription like a channel package, or pay-per-view like a single 
ice hockey game. Video-on-Demand can also be thought as a form of pay-TV, al-
though it resembles video renting rather than television. 
The success of free-TV financed by advertising is dependent on the channels’ 
ability to offer the advertisers desired audiences and target segments. Therefore, 
the channels are inclined to show programming responding to the taste and inter-
est of the solvent audiences.  
In research, mass media is therefore said to operate in a dual product market. The 
consumer market consist of people acquiring products of the media industry by 
buying, subscribing, or by paying TV licence fees. The other market consists of 
the audiences of mass media, i.e., the advertising market in which the actual 
product being sold to advertisers is the audience. (Nieminen and Pantti 2004) 
3.2.2 Value chain of mobile content 
The value chain of mobile content, presented in Figure 3 below, has some ele-
ments in common with the value chain of mass media. 
Non-portal 
content 
creation 
Non - portal 
content 
aggregation
Application 
platform
Portal access, 
aggregation, 
and 3rd party 
billing
End user 
billing
Mobile and IP 
network 
access Users  
Figure 3: 3G value chain (UMTS Forum 2001). 
In brief, the first block arrow, ‘non-portal content creation’ means the original 
source of the content. The ‘non-portal content aggregation’ means gathering and 
storing of content from various producers together. Application platform part 
provides tools for the content creators to build their content and applications on. 
Portal access and aggregation means providing a website or catalogue like access 
to the services and content. Third party billing means the inclusion of the third 
party content in the service operator’s end-user billing. The mobile and IP net-
work access means providing the network connectivity to the end-user. 
Strong vertical integration is also present in the mobile content value chain, al-
though regulation can force the decoupling of service and network operation in 
some markets, which has led to the appearance of mobile virtual network opera-
tors (MVNO). 
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3.2.3 Generic business ecosystem of mobile TV 
In mobile TV, mobile phone is the point of convergence for broadcast mass me-
dia and mobile communications. However, the biggest challenges do not lie in the 
technical solutions but in the relationships between different companies partici-
pating in delivering the services. (Kivisaari and Luukkainen 2005) 
For broadcast mass media, mobile TV promises new possibilities enabled by the 
existence of a widely adopted return path, the potentially abundant number of 
personal devices (i.e. reachable audience), and a secure billing mechanism. Mo-
bile industry on the other hand can be interested in extending their service range 
with TV content, and/or in making money by controlling the customer interface 
and interactions. Kivisaari and Luukkainen (2005) discuss the new business op-
portunities for different parties. 
Note that although the IPDC/DVB-H service delivery does not necessarily need 
the mobile networks (it uses a separate broadcast network much like conventional 
terrestrial TV), the most apparent way to provide a return path for a mobile phone 
type of device is via the mobile networks. 
Mobile TV then connects the broadcast mass media and mobile content value 
chains together creating a converging industry setting. In such context, modelling 
the business case using traditional value chain approach would be difficult. 
Therefore, we choose to apply business ecosystem approach. 
Moore J. F. (1993) suggests that to emerge, a business ecosystem has to design a 
compelling customer value proposition, i.e., the total service offering, so that the 
consumers would be willing and able to buy it. In addition, the ecosystem must 
be able to serve the potential market in the long term, i.e., it must be able to create 
a functional value network to deliver the service profitably.  
To construct a base of such a business ecosystem emerging around IPDC/DVB-H 
service in Finland we partly apply the business models suggested by Kivisaari 
(2006), the Digital Terrestrial Television Action Group, DigiTAG (2005) and the 
European Broadcasting Union, EBU (Weck and Wilson 2006). We also let the in-
terviewed experts state their views on the roles and interactions, and look at the 
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comparative arrangements in several mobile TV pilots and live networks around 
the world, studied by Braet et al. (2006).  
Figure 4 below shows the resulting generic business ecosystem we use in this 
thesis as a starting point for forming various business models. We call it generic, 
since it does not devise actual business players or business models. Instead, the 
generic ecosystem consists of a set of significant roles and possible interactions 
between them. One player can choose to perform one or more roles based on its 
business model, and several players can perform a given role simultaneously. The 
four different types of arrows in the figure signify the possible interactions be-
tween the roles. We are interested primarily in the monetary flows, shown as ei-
ther solid or dotted red arrows.  
The generic ecosystem might not be complete or exhaustive about the number of 
roles and interactions involved in the real world. Instead, it shows the roles and 
interactions we identified as having relevance for our study and serves in our 
view as a reasonable illustration of the playing field.  
Datacast
service
operators
Broadcast
network
operators
Collecting societies
Advertisers
Broadcasters
(Or content aggregators)
Content creators 
(Or external 
content aggregators)
End users
Mobile
network
operators
Mobile
service
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DRM 
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providers
Handset 
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Figure 4: Generic business ecosystem of IPDC over DVB-H in Finland. 
Table 1 below describes the roles in the generic ecosystem, applying the termi-
nology used by DigiTAG (2005), EBU (2006), and Kivisaari (2006).  
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Table 1: Roles in business ecosystem (DigiTAG 2005, EBU 2006, Kivisaari 2006). 
Role name Role description 
End user Has an IPDC/DVB-H enabled handset, consumes mobile TV ser-
vices, and pays for them directly or indirectly. 
Broadcast network operator Owns a DVB-H frequency licence. Operates the DVB-H network as 
well as the IP multicast network carrying broadcast streams to the 
transmitter sites. 
Datacast (service) operator Performs the central management of a technical mobile broadcast 
platform and sells the radio capacity. 
Broadcaster Runs one or more mobile TV or radio channels by creating the con-
tent in-house or by buying it from content aggregators/creators. 
Content aggregator Sources content from many content creators and acts as a broad-
caster, or resells the airing rights. 
Content creator Produces the original content. 
Rights issuer Accepts purchase requests, sends related Digital Rights Manage-
ment (DRM) rights objects to mobile terminals, and creates accord-
ing billing data records. 
Mobile service operator Provisions mobile services to end users. Has a billing relationship 
with mobile subscribers. 
Mobile network operator  Operates a mobile network and sells its capacity to mobile service 
operators and MVNOs. 
DRM trust model provider Certifies the robustness of the digital rights management (DRM) 
implementation. 
Handset manufacturer Manufactures IPDC/DVB-H enabled handsets and sells them to 
retailers such as mobile operators. 
TV fee collector Collects TV fees from end users possessing a television receiver. 
Collecting society Collects payments for the usage of copyrighted music for the copy-
right owners. 
Advertiser Pays for advertising minutes on TV or radio programming, and/or 
sponsors content creation. 
 
3.3 Regulation/competition scenario 
In this section, we describe what considerations we include in the regula-
tion/competition scenario and how they limit or open possibilities for the business 
ecosystem. 
Skouby and Tadayoni (2006) write that a regulatory trend of liberalisation has 
transformed the telecommunications business during the last 20 – 25 years, re-
moving the political-ideological basis for the national monopolies and introduced 
the ideas of trade and market forces in telecom services. The national monopo-
lies, which previously dominated the markets, have been substituted by systems 
separating operations, policymaking and regulation. An independent regulator as 
a neutral institution oversees the competition and tries to level the playing field 
between the government-owned incumbents and newcomers.  
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Finland was among the first countries to liberalise its telecommunications mar-
kets. The Finnish Ministry of Transport and Communications is responsible for 
the government of the communications sector. It looks after issues relating to 
communications networks, e-commerce, and the media, and monitors the work-
ing of the communications markets, the development of the information society, 
and the switchover to digital television. Finnish Communications Regulatory Au-
thority (FICORA), an agency under the ministry, handles the according regulative 
and administrative tasks. (Ministry of Transport and Communications, 2007) 
In effect, FICORA is responsible for the protection of the rights of the user of 
communications services, i.e. the consumer. It provides data on the development, 
pricing, and service level of communications markets and services. It also plans 
and administers the use of radio frequencies, and collects television fees and li-
cence fees to help finance public service programme production. Monitoring the 
content and advertising of television and radio programmes belongs also under 
FICORA’s tasks. (FICORA 2007a) 
Communications, including broadcasting and mobile telecommunication, is regu-
lated under the Communications Market Act of 2003 and its amendments. For the 
purposes of this thesis, we assume the current regulative setting to be in effect 
throughout the study period. 
3.3.1 Broadcast network operation 
With broadcast network operation, we mean the management of a DVB-H net-
work of radio transmitters as well as an IP multicast network carrying broadcast 
streams to the transmitter sites. 
The Communications Market Act (2003) states that a licence is required for pro-
viding a network service that uses radio frequencies in a digital terrestrial mass 
communications network (broadcasting). 
In 2006, Finnish government awarded the first, and to date only, DVB-H spec-
trum licence and multiplex to Digita. Digita takes two roles in the mobile TV 
ecosystem: the datacast service operator and the broadcast network operator. It 
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thus also sells the capacity and manages the technical platform of mobile broad-
casts.  
According to the DVB-H licence conditions (Ministry of Transport and Commu-
nications 2006a), Digita has agreed to build the network to cover 40% of popula-
tion by the end of 2007. Network coverage expansion beyond the 40% is left to 
Digita’s own decision and negotiations with the service parties.  
The DVB-H spectrum licence conditions also state that Digita cannot act as a 
service operator, and must therefore sell the network capacity to external parties. 
Furthermore, Digita’s DVB-H capacity pricing must be non-discriminatory and 
cost oriented. This means that the pricing must be transparent, same for all buy-
ers, and based on true costs plus a fair and reasonable profit margin. 
Although Digita has not been declared a significant market power (SMP) com-
pany in DVB-H, the above conditions are in effect comparative to an SMP ruling. 
According to our knowledge, the fair and reasonable margin has not been defined 
exactly and depends on the market risk. 
The licence conditions also restrict the maximum amount of capacity sold to one 
player to 1/3 of the total to enable a healthy market – one party then cannot buy 
the whole capacity and resell it at a higher price.  
According to interviewed experts, in the case that several service operators would 
provide the same channel and buy the required capacity for it, Digita would split 
up the capacity bill evenly.  
We assume that Digita will remain the sole holder of DVB-H spectrum licences, 
i.e., if further licences are granted, they go to Digita, as has happened with DVB-
T. 
According to interviewed experts, mobile TV does not have any universal service 
or must carry obligations regarding the national free-TV channels. Digita is there-
fore not required to deliver any given channels or build the network to full popu-
lation coverage. 
Since the radio capacity is scarce, we expect Digita to air each channel only once 
and the service operators to choose which channels they want to include in their 
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offering. One consequence of this is that the service differentiation possibilities 
for service operators can be more limited than in a model where each service op-
erator would also operate own network and arrange the channels independently. 
Digita’s pricing for a nationwide DVB-H television channel is as shown in Table 
2 below. We got the pricing information from Digita upon request. The base price 
for a national TV channel is EUR 39,400 per month, based on 40% population 
coverage. Digita gives ramp-up discounts during the 2007. If Digita expands the 
network’s population coverage beyond 40%, it can adjust the price upward to 
match the increased costs. Digita has yet to publicise the pricing for regional ca-
pacity, but we can expect them to be somewhat lower. 
Table 2: DVB-H capacity pricing for a nationwide TV channel (Digita). 
Period Network’s 
population coverage 
EUR per month 
(Excluding VAT 22%) 
First three months of 2007 25% 5,900 
Last nine months of 2007 25% - 40% 19,700 
Beginning of 2008 40% 39,400 
 
Table 3 below shows a rough comparison between DVB-T and DVB-H capacity 
pricing. The DVB-T pricing information is from Digita (2007). Note that these 
numbers assume no DVB-H network expansion beyond the 40% population cov-
erage, and that the whole population under DVB-T network coverage has access 
to digital terrestrial TV. The comparison shows that between 500,000 and one 
million DVB-H handsets are needed to get similar capacity prices; EUR 0.047 
per person for a nationwide DVB-T channel vs. EUR 0.079…0.039 for a DVB-H 
channel. All prices exclude VAT 22%. 
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Table 3: Comparison between DVB-T and DVB-H channel capacity pricing. 
DVB-T, technical network 
coverage 
Population 
coverage 
Population 
coverage, % 
EUR / month /  
TV channel 
(4Mbit/s) 
EUR / month / 
person 
Nationwide digital TV 5,200,000 100 % 245,000 0.047 
      
DVB-H, technical network 
coverage 
Population 
coverage 
Population 
coverage, % 
EUR / month /  
TV channel 
EUR / month / 
person 
Mobile TV first 4 months 1,300,000 25 % 5,900 0.005 
Mobile TV next 9 months 1,700,000 32 % 19,700 0.012 
Mobile TV Jan. 2008 2,100,000 40 % 39,400 0.019 
      
DVB-H, handset coverage Handset 
adopters 
Handset 
adopters / 
population, % 
EUR / month /  
TV channel 
EUR / month / 
person 
Mobile TV 10,000 0 % 19,700 1.970 
Mobile TV 100,000 2 % 39,400 0.394 
Mobile TV 500,000 10 % 39,400 0.079 
Mobile TV 1,000,000 19 % 39,400 0.039 
Mobile TV 1,500,000 29 % 39,400 0.026 
Mobile TV 2,000,000 38 % 39,400 0.020 
 
3.3.2 Broadcast service operation 
With broadcast service operation, we mean the pricing, sales, and marketing of 
mobile TV services to end users, and managing the distribution of DRM rights 
objects. A broadcast service operator then performs at least the rights issuer role. 
In principle, any player except Digita can become a broadcast service operator. In 
this thesis, we assume that both broadcasters and mobile service operators can 
become broadcast service operators. Moreover, we assume that a broadcaster be-
coming a broadcast service operator can bill the users directly or through a mo-
bile service operator in the mobile phone bill.  
3.3.3 Mobile network and service operation 
Mobile network operator is an operator that provides a public mobile network in 
its ownership or for other reasons in its possession for the purposes of transmit-
ting, distributing, or providing messages. Operating a public mobile telecommu-
nications network requires a licence. (Communications Market Act 2003) 
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Mobile service operator is an operator that transmits messages over a mobile 
network in its possession, or obtained for use from a mobile network operator. 
(Communications Market Act 2003) 
There are three licensed nationwide mobile network operators in Finland: Sonera 
Mobile Networks Oy, Elisa Oyj, and Finnet Verkot Oy. All three have licences 
for both GSM and WCDMA network operation. 
A mobile operator with both mobile service and mobile network operations is a 
vertically integrated mobile operator. Communications Market Act (2003) holds 
that such operators must separate their service and network operations in account-
ing. As the three nationwide mobile network operators in Finland are vertically 
integrated telecommunication groups, we can use the term mobile network opera-
tor (MNO) to refer to a vertically integrated mobile operator. 
Currently none of the large three MNOs has been ruled as a significant market 
power (SMP) regarding mobile network access and upstream traffic wholesale. 
None of them is therefore obliged to lease mobile network or enable upstream 
traffic for external service operators. Commercial factors have however led to 
voluntary leasing of networks and upstream capability, enabling the existence of 
external service providers (SP) and mobile virtual network operators (MVNO). 
(FICORA 2004) 
Communications Market Act (2003) does not currently define or distinguish vir-
tual network operators, and they are therefore regulated as actual network opera-
tors. In this thesis, we resort to Ministry of Transport and Communications 
(2005a), and define a mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) as a vertically in-
tegrated mobile operator, that: 
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• leases radio access network from a licensed mobile network operator 
(MNO),  
• has its own core network with a mobile switching centre (MSC) and a 
home-location register (HLR), 
• distributes its own subscriber identity modules (SIM) to its subscribers, and 
• can make interconnection agreements with other network operators. 
In other words, a MVNO acts both as a mobile service operator and as a network 
operator, but does not own a radio access network. 
3.3.4 Handset bundling 
Bundling the sales of a mobile terminal and a mobile subscription has been for-
bidden in Finland. A recent, temporary amendment in the Communications Mar-
ket Act of 2003, however, allows bundling a WCDMA-enabled terminal with a 
mobile subscription. The amendment is valid from 1 April 2006 to 1 April 2009.  
The maximum length of such a bundle period is 24 months, during which the 
WCDMA terminal may be locked to allow only a given operator’s SIM. In prac-
tice, the bundling has meant that the customer pays the handset in 24 monthly in-
stalments in his/her mobile subscription bill. 
In this thesis, we assume that the permission to bundle a WCDMA terminal and a 
subscription will be continued beyond 1 April 2009, and be in effect during the 
whole study period. 
In practice, this means that a DVB-H-enabled mobile phone can be sold bundled 
with a mobile subscription only if it is also WCDMA-enabled. 
3.3.5 Content provisioning and broadcasting policy 
Broadcasters or other content providers that want to broadcast content over DVB-
H have to obtain a mobile TV programming licence from FICORA. These li-
cences are currently available to anyone; the licensing process is lightened so that 
in practice filing in an application and paying a fee of EUR 100 per channel is 
sufficient. No new licence is required for simultaneous airing of channels already 
in digital terrestrial television, i.e., the digital terrestrial television licence is suffi-
cient also for simulcasts in DVB-H. (FICORA 2007b) 
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Transmitting content other than TV or radio programming, for instance games or 
interactive services, in addition to a TV or radio broadcast, does not require a 
programming licence. (FICORA 2007b). 
Distribution rights for the programming content must be licensed or bought from 
content owners. These are in general handled through agreements between the 
broadcaster and the content owner. In addition, a broadcaster has to pay licence 
fees for copyrighted music used in the programming through collective licensing. 
Collective licensing is done by a licensing organisation (collector society) on be-
half of its members (authors, composers, performers, etc.), or on behalf of also 
other right-holders of that particular area of rights (extended collective licensing). 
(Copyright Act 1961 and its amendments, Huuskonen 2006) 
According to interviewed experts, the free-TV channels with a national licence in 
conventional digital TV cannot charge consumers directly or indirectly for watch-
ing. Otherwise they could be regarded as pay-TV, which would affect their status 
as ‘must carry’ channels in cable TV, and possibly breach the terms of their pro-
gramming licences. A cable TV operator can however charge for cable access. It 
is not clear if similar arrangement is possible for simulcasts of these free-TV 
channels in DVB-H viewing. 
3.3.6 Spectrum policy 
Spectrum in the UHF band for one IPDC/DVB-H mobile TV network (multiplex) 
has been allocated for the whole country, excluding Åland, until 2026 (Ministry 
of Transport and Communications 2006a). 
In theory, more frequencies could be allocated in the future, as Finland secured 
spectrum for altogether nine nationwide networks (multiplexes) in the ITU Re-
gional Radiocommunication Conference RRC’06 last summer. (FICORA 2006a) 
The new frequencies can be used for digital television, radio, or multimedia. 
Seven of these are in the UHF band and two in the VHF band. In addition, new 
frequencies for several regional networks were obtained. In total, these frequen-
cies provide capacity comparable to about 50 analogue TV channels. (FICORA 
2006a) 
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3.4 Technology scenario 
This section describes the technical considerations we address in building the cal-
culation model. 
3.4.1 IPDC/DVB-H network 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) describes IPDC/DVB-
H as “An end-to-end broadcast system for delivery of any types of digital content 
and services using IP-based mechanisms optimised for devices with limitations 
on computational resources and battery. An inherent part of the IPDC system is 
that it comprises of a unidirectional DVB broadcast path that may be combined 
with a bi-directional mobile/cellular interactivity path. IPDC is thus a platform 
that can be used for enabling the convergence of services from broadcast/media 
and telecommunications domains (e.g. mobile/cellular).” (ETSI 2006) 
Figure 5 below shows the high-level implementation principle of an IPDC/DVB-
H network, applied from Silvennoinen (2006). The broadcast network consists of 
multiple single frequency networks (SFN) carrying the DVB-H multiplex. An 
SFN consists of an Internet Protocol Encapsulator (IPE) and one or several 
transmitters and repeaters. Each IPE may have a different set of services, and the 
IPEs can be centrally managed by the service platform. Regional content can also 
be streamed locally into an IPE. 
IP multicast
network
A/V Encoder
A/V Encoder
A/V Encoder
Service platform
Handset
A/V Encoder
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IPE
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SFN 2
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Figure 5: IPDC/DVB-H network implementation principle (applied Silvennoinen 2006). 
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DVB-H is a variation of the regular terrestrial digital TV standard DVB-T. The 
standard was designed so that in theory DVB-H could share a multiplex with 
DVB-T, which could be a way to deal with UHF frequency shortages in many 
European countries.  
However, in practice the DVB-T is intended for fixed rooftop antennas and line 
of sight reception conditions, which enable large coverage areas for high-power 
broadcast towers. DVB-H reception conditions on the other hand are character-
ised by non-line of sight, multi-path impairments, Doppler impairments, strong 
propagation losses, and poor receiver antenna gain. (Bria and Gómez-Barquero 
2005) 
Consequently the existing DVB-T broadcast network infrastructure alone (i.e. 
broadcast towers) would not be dense enough to provide plausible DVB-H indoor 
coverage. A significant number of new broadcast towers or going to a hybrid so-
lution using both existing broadcast towers and cellular base station sites (BTS) 
equipped with DVB-H transmitters or repeaters is therefore required.  
The hybrid solution, also called cellular infrastructure re-use, lowers the required 
transmission powers for broadcasting sites. This is because directional transmit-
ters and repeaters can be positioned in problem areas, so that the broadcast towers 
do not have transmit at very high power levels.  
Consequently, as transmitter powers are lower, the SFN size, as well as the range 
of interference, is reduced. This increases the potential to use the same SFN fre-
quencies again in nearby areas.  
However, while saving frequencies and investment costs by using less powerful 
DVB-H transmitters at broadcast towers and cellular sites, the cellular site re-use 
implies investment and leasing costs proportional to the number of leased sites 
and transmission links.  
According to interviewed experts, Digita will not build any new broadcast towers 
for DVB-H, and so they must opt for the hybrid solution, leasing BTS sites and 
transmission links from mobile network operators. 
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Silvennoinen (2006) writes that based on their simulations, the optimal network 
configuration consists of few large transmitter sites and several medium and 
small sized transmitter sites. Overall, the minimum power for the large broadcast 
towers should be 10 kW and for medium sized sites 4 kW – but local conditions 
may vary. In addition, the choice of modulation and the amount of forward error 
correction (MPE-FEC) have a considerable effect on the outcome. 
Silvennoinen (2006) reports getting best results using high power omni-
directional antennas in large sites whenever possible, and directional antennas in 
the medium and small sized sites. High antenna places are required to best utilise 
the high power omni-directional transmitters. This kind of configuration com-
bined with a longer guard interval and signal delaying also proved effective in re-
ducing interference.  
We then assume Digita to use its own broadcast towers for the high power trans-
mitters whenever possible, and lease BTS sites for less powerful directional 
transmitters and repeaters.  
Transmission site and link leases 
To be able to calculate the leasing revenues we need to estimate average lease 
fees for sites and links. Differing prices are used in various studies. We list a few 
of them here.  
Smura et al. (2006) assume that BTS site rental including electricity would cost 
EUR 15,000 per year and that a 2 Mbps transmission link would be EUR 5,400 + 
EUR 240 per km. 
According to Johansson et al. (2004) the rental for a macro BS site would be 
EUR 10,000 per year and EUR 5,000 per year for a micro site. An average trans-
mission link cost would be EUR 5,000 per year for a BS. 
According to data from Nokia, a DVB-H rental site could cost EUR 20,000 to set 
up, and then EUR 1,000 to operate per year. A 2 Mbps link could cost EUR 5,000 
per year and a 34 Mbps link EUR 30,000 per year. 
Note that the site rental can also depend also on the actual position of the trans-
mitter device in the mast; higher masts are more expensive than lower and a top 
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position is more expensive than lower positions (Silvennoinen 2006). For back-
haul transmission links, the link length and capacity affect the price. 
We then make a rough approximation that the average site lease is from EUR 
3,000 to EUR 10,000 EUR per year, and transmission link lease would be from 
EUR 15,000 to EUR 20,000 per year per leased transmitter site. The leasing 
revenue calculation used in our model is given in the section covering the envi-
ronmental scenario and network dimensioning. 
3.4.2 Service platform 
Figure 6 below shows the logical architecture of IPDC/DVB-H including the 
functional entities and interfaces as proposed by the DVB-H Project. The detailed 
descriptions for the entities and interfaces are given in ETSI TR 102 469 (ETSI 
2006). For our model, the important aspect in the system is that the service man-
agement can use an interactivity path for access control. In other words, an IP-
based network can be used for distributing access keys, i.e., rights objects, to end 
users.  
CMBS-1: PSI/SI (Fully specified by DVB-CBMS) 
CMBS-2: Carriage of A/V streams, files (Fully specified by DVB-CBMS)
CMBS-3: ESG metadata and point-to-multipoint delivery (Fully specified by DVB-CBMS)
CMBS-4: Access control to service applications, ESG metadata and point-to-point delivery (Fully specified by DVB-CBMS)
CMBS-5: Point-to-point transport services (SMS/MMS, IP connectivity), specified up to TCP/IP by DVB-CBMS
(CMBS-6 & CMBS-7: Considered to be valuable reference points but are not covered by the baseline specification)
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Figure 6: DVB-H architecture (redrawn, ETSI 2006). 
For the purposes of this thesis, we can call the entity formed by the service appli-
cation and service management the service platform. 
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Service platform handles producing the content IP streams (e.g. video streams) to 
the network. The IP streams are distributed over the multicast intranet to the IP 
encapsulators (IPE), which will package them into a ready DVB-H transport 
stream (TS) including time slicing and MPE-FEC. This TS is then distributed to 
the DVB-H transmitters. (Faria et al. 2006) 
Figure 7 below illustrates the new network elements required by the IPDC/DVB-
H service platform fitted on top of the mobile TV ecosystem, as implemented in 
Nokia Mobile Broadcast Solution (MBS) 3.0/3.1 (Nokia, 2006a). We apply this 
implementation because Digita chose Nokia as its service platform vendor (Nokia 
2006b). 
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Figure 7: IPDC/DVB-H service system elements (Nokia, 2006). 
The grey cubes represent physical network components needed in the 
IPDC/DVB-H service delivery platform. The new components are Audio/Video 
Encoder, Broadcast Service Manager (BSM), Internet Protocol Encapsulator 
(IPE), IPE Manager, and Broadcast Account Manager (BAM). 
A service operator needs a BAM to perform the rights issuer role, i.e., for han-
dling purchase requests, distributing access keys to subscribers, and generating 
according charging details and pre-paid reservations. The purchase requests and 
the DRM rights objects delivery are realised using a HTTP connection over the 
return path. (Kivisaari 2006) 
We assume a service operator to acquire BAM machinery by application leasing, 
so that the price is based on the annual number of channel package subscribers. 
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We do not know the actual pricing, but we can assume it to range from EUR 1 to 
EUR 5 per subscriber per year. 
3.4.3 Service capability 
The DVB-H output bit rate can be calculated using the equation: 
ST
KMrateBit 1)(log2 ⋅⋅=  
Where K is the number of OFDM carriers, TS is the duration of transmission of 
one symbol, and M is the modulation constellation size. For instance, an 8 MHz 
channel using 4K mode (K=3408), 1/4 guard interval, and 16QAM (M=16) con-
stellation has an output bit rate equal to around 20 Mbps. After Reed-Solomon er-
ror correction, the net bit rate is around 12 to 15 Mbps. (Herrero and Vuorimaa, 
2004) 
According to interviewed experts, the DVB-H network in Finland uses 16QAM 
modulation at least in the beginning, and the throughput is be around 10 to 12 
Mbps. Using MPEG-4 video codec, a single TV channel requires a bit rate 
around 384 kbps. Electronic service guide and other control overhead however 
consume some of the capacity. 
Signaali, the customer magazine of FICORA writes that the maximum number of 
concurrent TV services, i.e. TV channels, will be around 21 in the beginning. The 
capacity can be used for radio services as well, so that one TV service equals four 
to five radio services. (Signaali 2006)  
In the model, we assume the total channel capacity to be around 21 TV channels 
until the end of 2008, and from 30 to 40 channels from 2009 on. Other services 
such as multimedia or application distribution are also possible.  
3.5 Service scenario 
In this section, we describe the business models and services included in the 
analysis. We present the different business models through the set of roles taken 
by a service operator, and the resulting interactions with other players in the eco-
system. 
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3.5.1 Viewing models 
We assume there to be different viewing models in mobile TV. Some channels 
can be available free, financed by advertising or licence fees. Others can be avail-
able through pay-per-view or subscription. Some pay-TV channels or single pro-
grammes can be available separately, and some in channel bundles.  
Some of the channels can be plain simulcasts of existing DVB-T channels, espe-
cially in the beginning. Almost all of the experts interviewed however expect that 
mobile TV specific content will be more important in the future. 
The national broadcaster YLE has announced that its channels will be broadcast 
free of charge, if it decides to buy the capacity. YLE gets its financing from TV 
and licence fees collected by FICORA.  
According to the interviewed experts, the case remains unsolved for the commer-
cial free-TV channels financed by advertising. They have little incentive to buy 
expensive capacity in the beginning, when audiences are small. Experts consider 
that an audience of 100,000 to 500,000 would be adequate for advertisers to be-
come interested. In DVB-T, the free-TV channels buy the capacity themselves, 
but they instantly get full or significant population coverage. 
3.5.2 Offered services 
While there can be different viewing models, there can be a variety of services. In 
the model, we divide the offered services into four categories: TV content ser-
vices, interactive services, handset sales, and advertising sales.  
The most important parameters we use for a service in the model are market 
penetration, annual tariff or spending, and service start year. 
TV content services 
TV content services consist of free-TV channels, pay-TV channels, channel bun-
dles, and WCDMA video-on-demand streaming. Note that broadcasters can offer 
their regular DVB-T channels as free simulcasts outside the pay-TV channel 
packages. Table 4 below gives a complete listing and a short description of each 
service. 
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Table 4: TV content services included in the model. 
Service name Description 
Channel packages, monthly subscription - These are channel bundles consisting of two or more 
channels (TV & radio services). The packages can 
consist of new channels and/or simulcasts of existing 
DVB-T channels. 
- A service operator can (re)sell from one to three 
channel packages. 
- A channel package is available on a monthly sub-
scription (flat rate).  
- Service is distributed through the IPDC/DVB-H net-
work. 
DVB-H Free-TV and radio - These are free-TV channels, which are available to 
consumers without payment. They can be new chan-
nels or simulcasts of existing DVB-T channels. 
- Service is distributed through the IPDC/DVB-H net-
work. 
- This service can yield advertising revenue for its 
broadcaster. 
DVB-H Pay-TV subscription - These are short-term subscriptions of pay-TV chan-
nels, e.g. a single sport or movie channel, or a chan-
nel package.  
- Service is distributed through the IPDC/DVB-H net-
work. 
DVB-H Pay-TV Pay-per-View - These are subscriptions of single pay-TV pro-
grammes, e.g. sports events. 
- Service is distributed through the IPDC/DVB-H net-
work. 
3G Streaming Video-on-Demand - These are video-on-demand service distributed 
through the mobile data network. These can be e.g. 
short video clips or complete TV shows. 
 
Interactive services 
Interactive services are those that utilise the interactivity path. Note that apart 
from the applications and filecasting service, these services more or less exist in-
dependently of DVB-H, and are therefore considered only as far as they can bring 
incremental usage. Table 5 below gives a complete listing and a short description 
of each service. 
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Table 5: Interactive services included in the model. 
Service name Description 
Interactive: Communications 
 
Ordinary mobile communications, i.e., voice, SMS 
and MMS, triggered by mobile television watching. 
Can be e.g. person-to-person communications or free 
interactions with mobile TV content. 
Interactive: Premium SMS 
 
Interactions with mobile TV content that cost more 
than normal SMS. Can be e.g. a chat programme or 
voting. 
Interactive: Personalisation 
 
Sales of personalisation items related to mobile TV 
content. Can be e.g. ringtones, operator logos, wall-
papers etc. 
Interactive: E-commerce 
 
Sales of tangible or intangible goods related to mo-
bile TV content, e.g. MP3’s or DVD’s. 
Interactive: Applications and filecasting Sales of application or file downloads through the 
IPDC/DVB-H network. Can be e.g. games or news 
feeds. 
 
Handset sales 
A mobile operator type of service operator can distribute DVB-H handsets by 
selling the phones either directly or by bundling the handset with a mobile sub-
scription (only for WCDMA capable handsets). For simplicity, we assume that 
broadcaster or content aggregator type of service operators do not sell handsets. 
We consider only the incremental cash flows from selling DVB-H enabled hand-
sets compared to selling regular WCDMA handsets. Table 6 shows the parame-
ters we use for modelling handset sales. 
Table 6: Parameters related to handset sales. 
Parameter Range 
Proportion of consumers buying their DVB-H 
handsets from the service operator. 
60% - 85% for mobile operators. 
0% for broadcasters. 
Proportion of bundled handsets of all handsets 
sold in 2007. 
35% - 75%,  
annual growth factor 80% - 110%. 
Average length of handset replacement cycle. 
 
18 - 36 months. 
Average extra cost price (for a service operator) 
of a DVB-H handset compared to a conven-
tional WCDMA phone in 2007. 
EUR 20 - EUR 50,  
annual reduction factor 50% - 65%. 
Average extra retail margin of a DVB-H handset 
compared to a conventional WCDMA phone in 
2007. 
EUR 20 - EUR 50,  
annual reduction factor 50% - 70%. 
Average extra retail margin or operator subsidy 
of a bundled DVB-H handset compared to a 
conventional WCDMA phone in 2007. 
EUR 0 - EUR 30,  
annual reduction factor 50% - 70%. 
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For simplicity, we assume that when a service operator sells handsets directly to 
its customers, it purchases them from vendors during the same year it sells them. 
We can then calculate just the gained extra retail margins.  
On the contrary, when a service operator sells bundled phones, it purchases them 
from the vendors during the same year it gives them to customers, but customers 
pay the phone in 24 consecutive monthly instalments. Roughly, the operator then 
gets 25% of the phone price plus the retail margin (or minus the subsidy) during 
the same year, 50% on the next year, and 25% on the year after. Here we assume 
that there would be no credit risk in handset bundling. 
We approximate the replacement sales using the average replacement cycle for 
the operator’s whole DVB-H customer base, so that 50% of the customers replace 
their handsets during the year the average cycle length indicates, and 50% on the 
next year. 
Advertising sales 
Forecasting the flow of advertising money is difficult. The total advertising 
spending in Finland grows slowly, following roughly the GDP. Table 7 below 
shows that, while TV advertising is growing at the same pace as the total mass 
media advertising market, Internet advertising is currently experiencing double-
digit growth. 
Table 7: Media advertising 2004 - 2005 (Mainonnan neuvottelukunta 2006, 2007). 
 2004 2005 2006 Change 2005-2006 
TV advertising, MEUR 226.5 230.7 242.9 +5 % 
Radio advertising, MEUR 47.8 47.2 46.8 -1 % 
Internet advertising, MEUR  25.4 36.1 47.1 +30 % 
Electric media, total, MEUR 299.7 314.1 336.8 +7 % 
All media, total, MEUR 1,151.5 1,188.9 1,232.9 +4 % 
 
Mobile TV advertising will likely have to compete with other media for the same 
‘advertising pie’. In our mind, the pie can grow, i.e., new advertising money can 
be available in two ways: either if there are each year more new businesses start-
ing than old ones going out of business, or advertising spending of existing busi-
nesses increases overall for some reason in real terms. 
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Therefore, mobile TV advertising euros could be away from other media; if mo-
bile TV advertising is away from the conventional TV channel, or other forms of 
media under the same media group, then the gain would be zero. For simplicity, 
in the modelling we consider the advertising cash flow as incremental and not 
cannibalising other functions of a media group. 
We assume that only simulcast free-TV channels get mobile TV advertising 
money; pay-TV is free of advertisements. We also assume that advertising min-
utes can be sold separately for mobile TV, i.e., the advertising on mobile TV can 
differ from the original DVB-T broadcasts. Moreover, we assume that only 
broadcaster type of service operators would put up free-TV channels. Therefore, 
advertising affects only broadcaster type of service operators. 
We set total TV advertising in 2007 to MEUR 250 and have it grow 4% annually. 
We make a very rough approximation that DVB-H would get 2% of the total TV 
advertising spending for every 10 percentage points of population with DVB-H 
handsets. In other words, if 10% of population has DVB-H handsets, the free mo-
bile-TV channels get in total 2% of the total TV advertising spending; 4% for 
20% of population etc. We then multiply the total mobile TV advertising with the 
broadcaster’s market share to get the annual advertising revenue. 
3.5.3 Operating models 
The generic business ecosystem we described in Section 3.2.3 enables the map-
ping of different types of service operators and business models together. We call 
these different combinations of operator type and business model operating mod-
els.  
The primary source of money for the ecosystem is the end user, i.e., the con-
sumer. Consumers finance the whole ecosystem directly and/or indirectly by 
handing over money for e.g. handsets, payable mobile TV services, TV fees, and 
goods advertised on mobile TV. The ecosystem then channels the money to each 
player in accordance to e.g. its position in the value network, the risk it bears, and 
its negotiation power. The ecosystem is viable only if it manages to collect 
enough money from consumers to finance the whole service delivery network in 
the long term. 
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Then, for a service operator the money flows, namely revenues and costs, are 
based on its operating model. In the calculation model, we specify an operating 
model by using three key parameters: 
1. Is the service operator a mobile operator or a broadcaster? 
2. Does the service operator pay for DVB-H capacity? 
3. Does the service operator pay for rights to TV programming? 
If the service operator is a mobile operator, it can be either an MNO or an 
MVNO. In both cases, it has a billing system in place and a direct billing rela-
tionship with its mobile subscribers.  
If the service operator is a broadcaster or other content aggregator, it can either 
outsource its pay-TV billing to mobile service operators, or handle pay-TV bill-
ing in-house using other sales methods. In both cases, billing for interactive ser-
vices goes through mobile operators.  
If the service operator pays for DVB-H capacity directly, it pays a monthly sum 
to Digita for each TV channel. If there are several service operators providing ca-
pacity for the same channel, Digita will split up the capacity bill evenly between 
them. If the service operator does not pay directly for the capacity, it indirectly 
participates in its financing through a revenue sharing scheme. One service opera-
tor can buy at maximum 1/3 of the total capacity. 
If the service operator pays for rights to TV programming directly, it pays a 
monthly sum per subscriber per channel. If the service operator does not pay di-
rectly for the programming, it indirectly participates in its financing through a 
revenue sharing scheme. 
If the answer to questions two and three is no, the service operator merely resells 
other players’ TV channels and channel bundles. The model allows us to deter-
mine the case on service level, so that a mixed model would be possible. 
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Using the three above parameters and applying the work of Kivisaari (2006), 
Digital Terrestrial Television Action Group (DigiTAG) (2005), and European 
Broadcasting Union (EBU) (Weck and Wilson, 2006), we create in total seven 
different operating models for the analysis: 
1. MNO approach. 
2. MVNO approach. 
3. Broadcaster approach with outsourced billing. 
4. Broadcaster approach with in-house pay-TV billing. 
5. Pay-TV broadcaster with outsourced billing. 
6. Co-operation approach, MNO with broadcasters. 
7. Co-operation approach, MVNO with broadcasters. 
Operating model 1: MNO approach 
In this model, service operator is a vertically integrated mobile operator, i.e., a 
service operator with its own mobile network. It handles four roles in the ecosys-
tem: broadcaster, rights issuer, mobile service operator, and mobile network op-
erator. In EBU’s terminology, this model is “Mobile telecom operator-led ap-
proach with broadcast network operator.” 
Figure 8 below illustrates the model set up. The service operator performs the 
roles on light blue background, and Digita the roles on light green background. 
Table 8 below describes the numbered payment flows. 
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Figure 8: Roles and payment flows in MNO approach. 
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Table 8: Description of payment flows in MNO approach. 
Payment flow Description 
1. End user -> Service operator End users pay for TV services, interactive services, and 
handsets. 
2. Service operator -> Handset 
manufacturer 
Service operator pays for handsets it sells to end users. 
3. Service operator -> CMLA Service operator pays “Service Provider Key and Cer-
tificate Issuance Fee” to CMLA. 
4. Service operator -> Content 
creator 
Service operator purchases rights for complete TV 
channels or separate TV programming and interactive 
content. 
5. Service operator -> Collecting 
society 
Service operator pays fees for the copyrighted music in 
the TV programming and interactive services. 
6. Service operator -> Digita Service operator pays for DVB-H transmission capacity. 
7. Digita -> Service operator Digita pays leases for network infrastructure. 
 
Operating model 2: MVNO approach 
In this model, service operator is an MVNO. It provides mobile services and SIM 
cards to its subscribers, but leases mobile network access from an MNO. In 
EBU’s terminology, this model is the same as model 1, i.e., “Mobile telecom op-
erator-led approach with broadcast network operator”. 
Figure 9 below illustrates the model. The service operator performs the roles on 
light blue background, and Digita the roles on light green background.  
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Figure 9: Roles and payment flows in MVNO approach. 
The payment flows in this model are the same as in model 1 (shown in Table 8 
above), except that an MVNO gets no infrastructure leases from Digita, and that 
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an MVNO has to pay to a mobile network operator for the access to its mobile 
network to deliver the interactive services (payment flow #7 in Figure 9).  
Operating models 3, 4, and 5: Broadcaster approach 
In these models, service operator is a broadcaster that does not provision mobile 
connectivity or sell handsets. In EBU’s terminology, these models closest resem-
ble the “Content aggregator-led approach”. 
In models 3 and 4, the broadcaster provides both free-TV and pay-TV channels. 
In model 5, the broadcaster provides only pay-TV channels. In all three cases, the 
broadcaster provides also interactive services. 
In models 3 and 5, broadcaster outsources all end user billing to mobile operators. 
We label this approach as indirect broadcaster approach. In model 4, broadcaster 
performs end user billing for TV services in house. We label this approach as di-
rect broadcaster approach. However, we assume that all interactive services al-
ways go through mobile operator billing. 
Figure 10 below illustrates the model. The service operator performs the roles on 
light blue background, and Digita the roles on light green background. Table 9 
below describes the payment flows. 
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Figure 10: Roles and payment flows in broadcaster approach. 
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Table 9: Description of payment flows in broadcaster approach. 
Payment flow Description 
1. End user -> Service operator Model 4 only: End users pay for TV services directly. 
2. End user -> Mobile service op-
erator 
 
Models 3 & 5: End users pay for TV services and Inter-
active services through cellular operators. 
Model 4: End user pay for interactive services through 
cellular operators. 
3. Cellular mobile operator -> Ser-
vice operator 
Mobile service operator relays the service revenues to 
service operator after taking its share for end user bill-
ing. 
4. Service operator -> Content 
creator 
 
Service operator purchases rights for complete TV 
channels or separate TV programming and interactive 
content. 
5. Advertiser -> Service operator 
 
Model 3 & 4: Advertisers pay for advertising minutes on 
channels simulcast over DVB-H. 
6. Service operator -> Collecting 
society 
Service operator pays fees for the copyrighted music in 
the TV programming and interactive services. 
7. Service operator -> Digita Service operator pays for DVB-H transmission capacity. 
 
Operating model 6: Co-operation approach, MNO 
In this model, a MNO takes care of pricing, sales, and marketing of services pro-
vided by broadcasters. Broadcasters buy the capacity and rights for TV program-
ming and interactive content. 
Figure 11 below illustrates the model. The service operator performs the roles on 
blue background, and Digita the roles on light green background. Table 17 below 
describes the payment flows. 
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Figure 11: Roles and payment flows in co-operation approach, MNO. 
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Table 10: Description of payment flows in new player model. 
Payment flow Description 
1. End user -> Service operator End users pay for TV services, interactive services, and 
handsets. 
2. Service operator -> Handset 
manufacturer 
Service operator pays for handsets it sells to end users. 
3. Service operator -> CMLA Service operator pays “Service Provider Key and Cer-
tificate Issuance Fee” to CMLA. 
4. Service operator -> Broadcaster Service operator relays revenue to broadcaster, after 
taking its share. 
5. Broadcaster -> Content creator Broadcaster purchases rights for complete TV channels 
or separate TV programming and interactive content. 
6. Broadcaster -> Collecting soci-
ety 
Broadcaster pays fees for the copyrighted music in the 
TV programming. Copyright fees for interactive services 
go through mobile operators. 
7. Broadcaster -> Digita Broadcaster pays for DVB-H transmission capacity. 
8. Digita -> Service operator Digita pays leases for network infrastructure. 
 
Operating model 7: Co-operation approach, MVNO 
In this model, a MVNO takes care of pricing, sales, and marketing of services 
provided by broadcasters. Broadcasters buy the capacity and rights for TV pro-
gramming and interactive content. This model is then the same as model 6, ex-
cept that the MVNO pays to a MNO for access to a mobile network, and the 
MVNO does not get infrastructure leases from Digita. 
3.5.4 Revenue sharing 
We model the revenue sharing scheme for each distinct service using a revenue 
sharing matrix. The composition of the revenue sharing matrix for a mobile op-
erator based service operator differs somewhat from that for a broadcaster based 
service operator. Note that the revenue sharing is based on consumer prices ex-
cluding VAT 22%. The revenue sharing percentages are rough approximations.  
Table 11 below shows the revenue sharing scheme for mobile operator based 
models, i.e., models 1, 2, 6 and 7.  The ‘external content parties’ column ap-
proximates revenue sharing to external broadcasters or other content aggregators, 
which provide programming and content. If the service operator takes the broad-
caster role (models 1 & 2), and buys the programming rights directly, there is no 
revenue sharing between these parties. If the service operator does not take the 
broadcaster role (models 6 & 7), an external content aggregator pays for the pro-
gramming and capacity, and takes a share of the revenue. 
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If the service operator is an MVNO, it has to lease mobile network access from 
an MNO. We can approximate these network-leasing payments as revenue shar-
ing, although this might not be the standard practice in real world situations. 
Table 11: Revenue sharing for operating models 1, 2, 6, and 7. 
Models 1 & 2: A = 0%. 
Models 6 & 7: A = 70…85% 
Models 1 & 6: B = 0% 
Models 2 & 7: B = 5...10% 
Player 
 
 
Service 
External 
content 
parties 
Collecting 
society  
External 
mobile 
network 
operator 
Broadcast 
network 
operator 
(Digita) 
Channel package A 1.5%...3%   
Pay-TV subscription A 1.5%...3%   
Pay-TV Pay-per-View A 1.5%...3%   
Video-on-Demand 65% 3% B  
Communications   B  
Premium SMS 80%  B  
Personalisation 70% 8% B  
E-commerce 70% 6% B  
Applications & filec. 65%   10% 
 
Table 12 below shows the corresponding revenue sharing scheme for broadcaster 
based operating models, i.e., models 3, 4, and 5. The ‘external content creators’ 
column approximates the costs of video-on-demand and interactive content, al-
though this content might not be sold on revenue sharing basis in real world situa-
tions. 
Table 12: Revenue sharing for operating models 3, 4, and 5. 
Model 4: C = 0% 
Models 3 & 5: C = 15...30% 
Models 3, 4 & 5: D = 15…30% 
Player 
 
 
Service 
External 
content 
creators 
Collecting 
society  
External 
mobile ser-
vice opera-
tors 
Broadcast 
network 
operator 
(Digita) 
Channel package  1.5%...3% C  
Pay-TV subscription  1.5%...3% C  
Pay-TV Pay-per-View  1.5%...3% C  
Video-on-Demand 30% 6% C  
Communications   100%  
Premium SMS   D  
Personalisation 30% 8% D  
E-commerce 30% 6% D  
Applications & filec. 30%  D 10% 
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Service operator gets the remainder after the revenue sharing. For instance, 
Video-on-Demand revenue for a broadcaster type of service operator with out-
sourced billing (model 3) is:  
100% - 30% - 6% - C = 34…49%. 
We use ranges for the variables A, B, and C to enable simulating the effect of 
small changes in revenue sharing on the total business case. The fixed percent-
ages are rough estimates for the services we consider less important in the first 
years of mobile TV. 
Note that in real world, there can be threshold arrangements, so that in addition to 
the revenue sharing, content owner is guaranteed a given level of compensation 
regardless of the actual service revenue. According to an expert we interviewed, 
this is common in the mass media field. Our calculation model, however, as-
sumes that there are no such threshold arrangements. 
The copyright fees payable to Teosto for pay-TV channels are set to range from 
1.5% to 3%, following the current practice for cable-TV operators – according to 
Teosto’s (2007) price lists, cable-TV operators must hand over 1.5% of their af-
ter-tax pay-TV revenues to Teosto. We assume that mobile TV programming can 
be more audio oriented than conventional TV programming, hence it can have a 
higher amount of music. 
Moreover, Teosto takes 12% of after-tax revenue for selling a ringtone or for a 
downloaded MP3 song. If half of the e-commerce revenue would consist of MP3 
sales, half of the revenue would be subject to the 12% fee, hence resulting in 6% 
share of the total. We can use a similar figure for video-on-demand, since the 
video material can hold copyrighted music. As for personalisation, if 70% of the 
sales would consist of ringtones etc., Teosto’s share would be 8%.  
3.5.5 Operational expenditure 
In the calculation model, we consider only incremental operational expenditure 
(OPEX), i.e., the new outgoing cash flows that result from the business case of 
provisioning DVB-H mobile TV services.  
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To get the total OPEX contribution of the business case, we then start from pieces 
and model the following OPEX categories: 
• Equipment and software licences and maintenance outsourcing 
• Sales, marketing, and customer acquisition 
• Customer care 
• Charging and billing 
• Service management and service development 
• Regulation 
• DVB-H capacity lease 
• TV programming 
The numbers given under the category definitions are based on either expert in-
terviews or our own estimates. If not specified otherwise, all variable ranges are 
uniformly distributed. 
Equipment and software licences and maintenance outsourcing 
This OPEX category includes expenses paid by the service operators to the BAM 
equipment vendor as well as the associated DRM fees paid to a DRM certifier. 
This cost category is applicable only to the mobile operators (models 1, 2, 6, & 
7). 
We assume that the service operators acquire the BAM through application rent-
ing, so that the rental includes all hardware, software licences, and maintenance. 
The rental is set to range from EUR 1 to EUR 5 per active subscriber per year. 
We then calculate the BAM expense as the rental payment times the annual aver-
age number of channel package subscribers. 
Application rental disables depreciation tax shields, which would be available if 
the service operator purchased the machinery directly and included it in the capi-
tal expenditure. However, it is probable that mobile TV service business will not 
make a profit during the first years of operation, and hence would not bring about 
incremental corporate taxes either, making the depreciation tax shields useless 
anyhow.  
For using the BAM, the service operator must pay a quarterly fee to Content 
Management Licence Administrator (CMLA). CMLA is a licensing and compli-
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ance entity formed by Intel, Nokia, MEI/Panasonic and Samsung to provide an 
implementation of the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) Digital Rights Management 
(DRM) version 2.0 interoperability specifications (CMLA 2007a). CMLA assures 
content providers that each licensed rights issuer (with BAM equipment) follows 
the specifications. 
The name of the quarterly fee to CMLA is “Service Provider Key and Certificate 
Issuance Fee”, and its size depends on the number of active subscribers. Table 13 
below shows the fees for different subscriber quantities. 
Table 13: Quarterly CMLA fees, USD (CMLA 2007b). 
Active subscribers Fee 
1 – 5,000 $1,500 
5,001 - 100,000 $2,500 
100,001 - 250,000 $4,500 
250,001 - 1/2 Million $7,000 
1/2 – 1 Million $9,450 
1 - 2 Million $12,750 
2 - 4 Million $17,225 
4 - 8 Million $23,250 
 
We multiply the quarterly fee by four and by the average number of channel 
package subscribers to get the total cost per year. In converting the CMLA fee to 
EUR, we assume a constant currency rate of EUR 1 = USD 1.3 throughout the 
study period. 
Sales, marketing, and customer acquisition 
This category includes costs that result from sales, marketing, advertising cam-
paigns, and other sales promotion activities, as well as costs related to handset 
bundling. 
For simplicity, we model everything except handset bundling as one annual lump 
sum, so that we specify the initial sum for 2007 marketing spending, and then an 
annual development factor as a percentage. The size of marketing spending has 
an effect on the service demand, as we later describe in the section covering the 
environmental scenario. 
The method is by no means accurate, but we do not have sufficient data to fore-
cast the operators’ sales and marketing efforts and behaviour. Table 14 below 
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shows the marketing spending in 2007 and annual development factors we use for 
the different operating models.  
Note that on average, mobile operators spend less each year on marketing mobile 
TV, as we expect them to have new services taking up focus and share of their 
limited marketing budgets in the future.  
In contrast, we expect broadcasters to spend on average the same sum each year 
as we expect mobile TV to become an important distribution channel for them. 
Table 14: Marketing spending parameters 
Operating model 
 
Marketing 
spending  
2007, MEUR 
Annual  
development, 
% 
1. MNO approach 0.5 - 3 80% - 110% 
2. MVNO approach 0.2 - 2 80% - 110% 
3. Broadcaster approach with outsourced billing 0.5 - 2 90% - 110% 
4. Broadcaster approach with in-house pay-TV billing 0.5 - 2 90% - 110% 
5. Pay-TV broadcaster with outsourced billing 0.5 - 2 90% - 110% 
6. Co-operation approach, MNO with broadcasters 0.4 - 2 70% - 100% 
7. Co-operation approach, MVNO with broadcasters 0.4 - 2 70% - 100% 
 
To calculate handset bundling costs, we first multiply the annual number of hand-
sets sold by the annual share of bundled handsets, and then multiply the result by 
the annual extra cost price of a DVB-H-enabled phone compared to a conven-
tional WCDMA phone. We specify the above-mentioned parameters for 2007, 
and then scale them using respective annual development factors. Note that only 
mobile operators do handset sales and handset bundling. 
The share of bundled DVB-H handsets is from 35% to 75% in 2007, and its an-
nual development is from 80% to 110%. The share of bundled handsets is limited 
to 100%. 
The extra cost price of a DVB-H handset is from EUR 20 to EUR 50 in 2007, and 
its development factor is from 50% to 65%, halving the cost price each year from 
2008 onwards. 
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Customer care 
This category includes customer service related costs, which can be for instance 
due to running help desk functions and handling customer complaints. We model 
these costs through labour costs.  
We estimate the number of extra customer care personnel needed in 2007 and 
then multiply it with a growth factor for to get the following years. We get the 
annual spending by multiplying the number of personnel by the annual cost of la-
bour. 
We assume the number of needed extra customer care personnel to be small for 
mobile operators, as they already have help desk functions. Note that a broad-
caster that outsources all billing to a mobile operator needs no or very little cus-
tomer service functions. 
The number of needed new personnel is then larger for a broadcaster type of ser-
vice operator that does not outsource billing and does not have sufficient existing 
consumer service operations.  
Table 15 below shows the number of personnel for different operating models. 
We set the average total cost of labour throughout the study period to be EUR 
50,000 per year per person. The annual development factor ranges from 100% to 
110%.  
Table 15: Customer care parameters 
Operating model Extra customer care 
personnel 2007 
1. MNO approach 0.2 - 1 
2. MVNO approach 0.2 - 1 
3. Broadcaster approach with outsourced billing 0 - 0.2 
4. Broadcaster approach with in-house pay-TV billing 2 - 4 
5. Pay-TV broadcaster with outsourced billing 0 - 0.2 
6. Co-operation approach, MNO with broadcasters 0.2 - 1 
7. Co-operation approach, MVNO with broadcasters 0.2 - 1 
 
Charging and billing 
If a broadcaster type of service operator does not outsource billing to a mobile 
operator, it has to arrange charging and billing otherwise to sell its channel pack-
ages. This category includes costs associated with usage metering, data collec-
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tion, and billing, as well as issuing rights objects or handling other means of con-
ditional access. 
We model this with a monthly cost per active subscriber ranging from EUR 0.20 
to EUR 0.60. Note that the billing for interactive services goes through the mo-
bile service operators in any case. 
Service management and service development 
This category includes costs related to e.g. having a responsible service manager 
to take care of the project and relations to other companies in the value network. 
The category also includes the service development engineers and other people 
participating in designing, implementing, and running the services.  
We model this category by using a lump sum for service management in 2007 
and an annual development factor. For the service development part, we use the 
number of extra personnel needed in 2007, an annual development factor, and the 
annual cost of labour. 
The service management lump sum in 2007 ranges from EUR 50,000 to EUR 
150,000, and its annual development factor ranges from 70% to 110%. Number 
of extra personnel needed in 2007 ranges from 2 to 6, and its development factor 
ranges from 70% to 110% as well. The average annual total cost of labour 
throughout the study period is set to EUR 75,000. 
Regulation 
This category consists of possible costs related to collecting and reporting infor-
mation to the regulator, and possible costs due to changes in regulation. We ap-
proximate the costs with a small fixed lump sum per year, EUR 20,000. The ef-
fect of this category on the business case is limited, and it is included essentially 
for caution. 
DVB-H capacity lease 
This category includes the DVB-H network capacity payments to Digita. For 
simplicity, we assume that all capacity is nationwide. The price is then same for 
all TV channels. 
We model the capacity costs by multiplying the price of one channel by the num-
ber of channel capacities bought by the service operator. If there are many service 
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operators provisioning the same channel packages, we divide the capacity bill for 
those channels by the number of service operators. We can set the number of ser-
vice operators sharing a channel package separately for each year during the 
study period. 
The price of channel capacity follows the network coverage, as Digita’s CAPEX 
and OPEX costs increase in proportion to the number of transmitters and repeat-
ers in use. 
We assume the network’s population coverage to be 40% at the end of 2007, and 
from 55% to 78% at the end of 2011. We assume the maximum number of chan-
nels on air to be 21 during 2007 and 2008, and 35 between 2009 and 2011. One 
player can buy maximum 1/3 of the total capacity, i.e., from 7 to 11 channels, 
unless several players jointly finance some of the channels. We cover the cost of 
capacity in Section 3.3.1. 
If a service operator does not pay directly for capacity, it does not have capacity 
related costs. Digita then gets money from broadcasters, which get money from 
the service operator through revenue sharing. 
TV programming 
This category includes costs related to acquiring programming for the chan-
nels/channel packages. If the service operator does not pay directly for the con-
tent, it will not have programming expenses and the money will go to content 
parties through revenue sharing. 
According to an expert from the TV field, broadcasters will likely acquire the 
programming on a whole channel basis instead of single programmes. The pro-
gramming cost is based on the number of subscribers. In the beginning, the pro-
gramming can be even free, as media houses compete for market shares, and sev-
eral extra channels can be bundled together with one quality channel.  
We model the programming costs by using an average cost per channel for each 
channel package. We then multiply it by the number of channels in each channel 
package. We set the monthly average cost per channel per subscriber to range 
from EUR 0.20 to EUR 0.50. We assume that simulcasts bear no additional pro-
gramming costs when showed on DVB-H mobile TV. 
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3.6 Environmental scenario 
In this section, we describe how we model the target market in terms of network 
dimensioning, potential service usage, and market penetration over time. 
3.6.1 Network dimensioning 
The focus of this study is on the service side of mobile TV, but we need estimates 
for the cash flows resulting from site and transmission link leasing. Hence, for the 
purpose of this thesis, we can conduct a very rough network dimensioning 
through comparison between area types and existing broadcast network infra-
structure. 
Geography and population density 
Finland, as a typical Nordic country, has a small population compared to the total 
land area and hence a low population density. Table 16 below shows the division 
of the total land area of a typical Nordic country into “dense urban”, “urban”, 
“suburban”, and “rural” area types applying the figures from Smura et al. (2006). 
Smura et al. have also studied the division of the total mobile telecoms traffic be-
tween area types. 
Table 16: Division of land area and mobile traffic (Smura et al. 2006). 
Area type Typical Nordic 
country, 
size of area, 
km2 
Share of total  
area, % 
Finland, 
size of area, 
km2 
Share of total 
mobile tele-
coms traffic 
Dense urban 17 0.005% 20 15% 
Urban 264 0.08% 313 50% 
Suburban 3,300 1% 3,910 25% 
Rural 264,000 80% 312,800 10% 
Total 330,000 100% 391,000 100% 
 
The definition of urban area varies in different sources. Statistics Finland (2006a) 
reports that urban settlements in Finland covered 2.2% of total land area and 
82.3% of the population in 2000, whereas the Statistic Division of United Nations 
reports that only 62% of Finnish population lived in urban areas in 2004.  
We can use the estimate of the Ministry of Transport and Communications 
(2005b), according to which 50% of the population lives in an area that covers 
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0.4% of the total land area, and that the most densely populated 1% of land area 
holds 71% of people. 
Therefore, we could say that building the network in the largest cities alone will 
easily provide the required 40% population coverage. After that, people start to 
be located less densely.  
Moreover, during the busy hours of weekdays, the cities become even more 
populated, since a lot of people commute from surrounding communities. The in-
terviewed experts see the commuters as a potential user group for mobile TV, and 
building coverage over the major highways and roads connecting the largest cit-
ies could make sense. 
Comparison with DVB-T 
Figure 12 below shows the largest functional urban regions in Finland in 2000 
(left side) and Digita’s main DVB-T broadcast towers (right side).  
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Figure 12: Urban regions (redrawn, OECD 2003) and Digita’s DVB-T broadcast towers. 
All broadcast towers transmit the multiplexes A and B. The shaded broadcast 
towers transmit also the multiplex C, which includes pay-TV channels and some 
smaller free-TV channels. DVB-T population coverage is 99.9% for multiplexes 
A & B, and from 78% to 83% for multiplex C. (www.digitv.fi) 
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By comparing the two maps in Figure 12, we can see that the multiplex C is 
available mainly in the most densely populated areas. According to the DVB.H 
spectrum licence, the DVB-H population coverage would be at maximum around 
75% and its bulk would consist of the largest cities and the major roads connect-
ing them. Areas with a low population density will likely be left outside. 
During 2007, Digita will have in total 28 sites broadcasting multiplex C: 17 main 
transmitters and 11 gap-fillers. These main transmitter towers have further 61 gap 
fillers, which are currently not transmitting multiplex C. 
From the above information, we can conclude that the eventual population cover-
age will be from 40% to 80%. This means that if network expansion beyond the 
40% requirement is undertaken, it will supposedly follow roughly the same areas 
as DVB-T multiplex C covers during 2007, starting with the densest areas.  
Infrastructure leasing 
Digita owns a vast network of broadcast towers and transmission links, but DVB-
H indoor coverage requires a large number low-power transmitters. The hybrid 
solution of using both broadcast towers and cellular BTS sites is the soundest op-
tion, but requires Digita to lease the BTS sites from mobile network operators. 
Figure 13 below illustrates the structure of IPDC/DVB-H transmission network. 
The Internet Protocol Encapsulators (IPE), which encapsulate the IP packets into 
MPEG transport stream, are connected to the IP multicast network by backbone 
links. The transmitters are connected to the IPE by a backhaul link. Repeaters/gap 
fillers do not need transmission links as they listen to the actual radio transmis-
sion from the main transmitter and retransmit it.  
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Figure 13: IPDC/DVB-H transmission network structure (applied Hoikkanen 2006b). 
Note that a mobile network operator can probably make network infrastructure 
leasing deals with Digita even if it self chooses not to start provisioning/reselling 
IPDC/DVB-H services. However, staying out could slow down the adoption of 
handsets, and thus slow down the expansion of the DVB-H network beyond the 
40% population coverage, affecting the eventual number of leased sites. There-
fore, the infrastructure leasing revenues for a mobile network operator can be 
partly non-incremental and partly incremental cash flows resulting from the busi-
ness case. For the sake of clarity when presenting results, we give the NPV of 
these cash flows separately from the service cash flows. 
To make an estimate of the lease payments, we must consider the network-
building schedule, the eventual total number of transmitter and gap filler sites to 
be used, the proportion of leased sites, and the size of the lease payments itself. 
At the outset, we know that the required number of transmitters for DVB-H is 
considerably larger than for DVB-T, but much lower than for GSM or WCDMA 
(Hoikkanen 2006a). We know that for 78% population coverage in DVB-T, 
Digita uses 17 main transmitters and 11 gap fillers. The WCDMA network on the 
other hand may require around 2,200 sites for 60% - 70% coverage (Ministry of 
Transport and Communications 2005b). 
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Digita has already announced that the network has been built to cover parts of the 
capital region, Turku, and Oulu, resulting in initial population coverage of 25%. 
This will be expanded to around 40% by the end of 2007, when Tampere region 
is included. 
Kauppalehti (2006b) quotes Tom Granvik, the CEO of Rohde & Schwarz 
Finland, saying that slightly over ten transmitters would be sufficient in the capi-
tal region in the beginning. From the simulations presented by Silvennoinen 
(2006) and based on the opinion of an IPDC/DVB-H service system expert, we 
conclude roughly that from 15 to 20 sites (transmitters and repeaters) could be 
adequate in the capital region in the final setting. We expect both Turku and Oulu 
to have from 5 to 10 sites. From these numbers we conclude that the first three 
areas need roughly in total from 25 to 40 sites. 
According to Hoikkanen (2006a), the number of needed repeaters is roughly 
twice the number of transmitters. This would imply using from 9 to 14 transmit-
ters and from 18 to 28 repeaters in the first three cities.  
The type, transmission power, and number of DVB-H transmitters can vary ac-
cording to the land area type. In dense urban areas, characterised by tall concrete 
buildings, many low power transmitters are needed to provide plausible in-door 
coverage, whereas few high-power transmitters can be enough for highways and 
rural areas with open terrain. Therefore, the average “cell” ranges of DVB-H 
transmitters are different for each area type. According to Smura et al. (2006), the 
area type specific DVB-H cell ranges are as follows:  
• Dense urban 1.5 km, 
• urban 2.5 km, 
• suburban 10 km, and 
• rural 30 km. 
These ranges are based on providing a plausible indoor coverage. Large city cen-
tres will need significantly more sites than less dense suburbs and rural areas. For 
large rural areas and roads, providing outdoor coverage can be sufficient, which 
would expand the cell range even further especially with directional antennas.  
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We can then estimate that for every main transmitter Digita uses for DVB-T mul-
tiplex C, it would need from 10 to 15 DVB-H sites (transmitters and repeaters) 
for providing 78% population coverage, i.e., from 10*17 = 170 to 15*17 = 255. 
This would mean from 57 to 85 transmitters and twice as many repeaters. Note 
that these figures are not based on actual network measurements and can be unre-
alistic. 
Since Digita owns 17 transmitters and around 70 gap-fillers in these areas, it 
would need to lease approximately from 50% to 65% of the sites to achieve 78% 
population coverage. We can use this figure as an estimate for the average pro-
portion of leased sites. 
The annual site leasing revenue for a mobile network operator is then calculated 
as follows: 
M * [(Ntxi + 2NTxi) * L * LTx) + NTxi * L * Ltr] 
Where: 
M = mobile network operator’s market share of leased sites, %. 
NTxi = number of transmitter sites in use in year i. 
L = average proportion of transmitter and repeater sites leased. 
LTx = annual site lease, EUR. 
Ltr = annual transmission link lease, EUR. 
The annual numbers of transmitter sites (Ntxi) is acquired by scaling the annual 
network population coverage by number of sites required for 78% coverage. For 
example, we know from the licence conditions that the population coverage at the 
end of 2007 must be 40%, and thus get: 
NTx2007 = 40% / 78% * 57…85 ~ 29…44 
In the calculations, we set the eventual network population coverage for year 
2011 to range from 55% to 78%. 
3.6.2 Service market dimensioning 
Forecasting the potential market size and service penetration is among the most 
critical tasks in the bottom-up service modelling approach, since most revenues 
and possibly a significant part of operational expenditure are dependent on the 
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number of users. To estimate the market size and revenues for the IPDC/DVB-H 
mobile TV services, we need to forecast two penetrations:  
1. How many people will buy a DVB-H enabled handset, and 
2. How many of these people will subscribe to the services? 
Intuitively the first side of the problem determines the size of the potential service 
market, and the second side determines the reached service penetration. For the 
potential market, the upper limit will be the total population of Finland, but for 
the service penetration, it will effectively be the DVB-H network coverage.  
Especially in the first years, people living and working outside the network cov-
erage are likely to have little motivation to invest hefty sums to a DVB-H enabled 
handset. This limitation can become obsolete if the extra price of the DVB-H fea-
ture becomes negligible in some point of time. Here the word price implies both 
monetary cost and inconvenience cost of carrying a bulky device.  
The initial limiting natural factors for service operator revenues are then in de-
scending order: population size, network coverage, handset penetration, and pay-
able service penetration. 
3.6.3 Handset adoption 
Intuitively, the size of the service market equals the number of DVB-H enabled 
phones sold to the public. We can then model the potential service market size as 
the outcome of an innovation diffusion process, so that the size of the available 
market grows with the adoption of DVB-H handsets over time. 
In adoption process, a population member makes an adoption decision and there-
fore, usually irrevocably, changes state from non-adopter to adopter. This process 
usually takes the shape of an S-curve showing cumulative diffusion over time, 
and a bell-shaped curve showing the rate of diffusions per period over time, as 
shown in Figure 14. The cumulative penetration always increases over time and 
approaches a saturation level (100% in Figure 14) as an asymptote. (Meade & Is-
lam 2001) 
The bell-curve closely resembles the normal distribution. Rogers (2003) has sug-
gested the widely known division of people into five adopter categories based on 
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their time to adopt an innovation and other behaviour characteristics. These five 
categories and their respective percentage shares are innovators (2.5% of adopt-
ers), early adopters (13.5%), early majority (34%), late majority and laggards 
(16%). Figure 15 below illustrates the division. 
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Figure 14: An idealised logistic S-curve and an idealised bell-curve. 
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Figure 15: Innovation adopter categories (Rogers 2003). 
The reality of technology adoption is complex. Changes in for instance consumer 
needs and desires, the overall economic development, or competition between 
different standards and different vendors, can have a great impact on the process. 
Identifying all significant factors and accurately modelling their effects on the 
process would be hard or impossible. 
Meade and Islam (2001) have compared numerous diffusion models against 
documented diffusions of actual innovations. They found out that simple models, 
such as the logistic curve, tend to produce more accurate forecasts than more 
complex ones, especially when the forecast is based on historical time series data 
with few observations.  
Logistic and Gompertz functions 
For the purposes of this thesis, we choose two simple forecast models: logistic 
and Gompertz functions. They both generate an S-curve, but the logistic function 
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is symmetric about its point of inflection, whereas the Gompertz function is 
asymmetric. Figure 16 below illustrates the two curves. 
Logistic function Gompertz function  
Figure 16: Examples of Logistic and Gompertz functions. 
The equation of the logistic function is: 
btce
atf −+= 1)(  
The equation of the Gompertz function is: 
btceaetf
−−=)(  
Where a denotes the saturation level, i.e. the upper asymptote, and b and c are 
shape parameters.  
We can test the shapes of the functions by fitting them against actual data of 
GSM diffusion in Finland, as shown in Figure 17 below. The data is from Mäki-
nen and Nokelainen (2003) and Ministry of Transport and Communications 
(2006b). Clearly, with right parameters, both models can take the shape of mobile 
phone diffusion process. Note that this test does not measure the functions’ abil-
ity to forecast the diffusion. 
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Figure 17: Logistic and Gompertz curves fitted to GSM diffusion in Finland. 
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Now, using these two functions and some unorthodox amendments, we can form 
forecasts of the DVB-H handset adoption. We want to create three different adop-
tion forecasts to test the sensitivity of the business case to the number of hand-
sets. We call the three forecasts optimistic, average, and pessimistic cases. 
Optimistic forecast: DVB-H catches up smartphones 
Many of the interviewed experts predicted that DVB-H capability would eventu-
ally be in all handsets. Some predicted that mobile phones would be only one 
class of devices among many others: car navigators, gamepads, handheld media 
players, etc.  
For the purpose of this thesis, we make a prediction that during the study period 
the DVB-H capability will be included mainly in the smartphone category. 
Smartphones are the higher-end mobile phones that run on a commercial operat-
ing system, such as Symbian S60 or Windows Mobile, and allow installing addi-
tional native applications. Smartphones are a likely platform for the DVB-H ca-
pability, because handling a high bit rate video requires a lot of computational 
power and especially a decent colour screen of at least few inches across.  
In Finland, Nokia is the clear market leader in smartphones with almost 99% 
market share (Kivi 2006, 2007). A possible scenario then is that Nokia, by a ven-
dor decision, includes DVB-H capability in majority of its smartphones in the fu-
ture. This enables us to estimate the DVB-H handset adoption against the smart-
phone adoption so that the DVB-H handsets will catch up with the smartphone 
diffusion curve and then continue growth along it.  
Such strategy would help Nokia as a handset manufacturer to promote DVB-H 
adoption as well as boost the sales of its higher end devices. The scenario is plau-
sible, as Mr. Kallasvuo, the CEO of Nokia, recently publicly estimated the cost of 
a DVB-H receiver chip and antenna to be together around seven euros in 2008. 
To model this scenario, we can fit the Logistic and Gompertz functions to the ac-
tual time series data we have for smartphone adoption in Finland. We do this by 
using the least squares method.  
Least squares method attempts to find a function that best approximates a given 
set of data points. It does this by minimising the sum of the squares of the ordi-
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nate differences, i.e. residuals, between the points generated by the function and 
the corresponding data points. The sum of the squares of the residuals (S) is given 
by the equation: 
∑
=
−=
n
i
ii tfyS
1
2))((  
Where: 
n = number of data points 
ti = point of time in years 
yi = data point at ti 
f(ti) = point generated by the function at ti 
We then solve for the parameters a, b and c, so that the sum of least squares be-
tween the functions and actual data is minimised. Table 17 below shows the re-
sults. The historical smartphone data is adapted from Ministry of Transport and 
Communications (2006b). Data point for 2006 is our own estimate based on live 
network measurements from late 2005 and 2006 (Kivi 2006, 2007). 
Table 17: Forecast functions fitted to smartphone data. 
Parameters Logistic Gompertz 
  a 56% 100% 
  b 0,695 0,218 
  c 114,959 6,302 
   
Actual data points Function generated points 
  y1 (2001) = 0.0% 0,48% 0,18% 
  y2 (2002) = 1.2% 0,95% 0,63% 
  y3 (2003) = 2.4% 1,88% 1,69% 
  y4 (2004) = 3.7% 3,64% 3,76% 
  y5 (2005) = 6.1% 6,84% 7,15% 
  y6 (2006) = 12.5% 12,20% 11,98% 
 
Least squares (S ) 
 
0,00011 
 
0,00021 
 
The least squares value (S) of the logistic function is better than that of the 
Gompertz function, indicating a better fit. The logistic function forecasts that the 
smartphone penetration will reach 56% penetration (after 2013) whereas 
Gompertz function forecasts 100% penetration (much later). Figure 18 below 
shows the functions fitted to the smartphone data. 
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Figure 18: Smartphone adoption forecasts, logistic vs. Gompertz. 
The next step is to make DVB-H handset penetration catch up with the smart-
phone penetration. As discussed earlier, we expect Nokia to include the DVB-H 
capability eventually in all of its smartphones. 
First DVB-H enabled handsets were introduced in 2004 for pilot network testing 
purposes. Commercially available handsets from Samsung and LG appeared in 
mid-2006 together with the first commercial network in Italy. In Finland, the first 
handsets are expected to be the Nokia N92 and N77 smartphones, possibly avail-
able during 2007. 
DVB-H capability is a handset feature, so we can estimate its adoption using 
some previously introduced features. Ministry of Transport and Communications 
(2006b) has published time series data from 2001 to 2005 for the so called ‘fea-
ture phones’ and phones with built-in camera.  
The term feature phone is defined as a handset having at least the following fea-
tures or abilities while not being a smartphone: colour screen, GPRS, WAP, 
MMS, and Java.  
We can shift the 2001 - 2005 data points of built-in camera and feature phones 
forward in time, so that the curves begin in year 2007. Figure 19 below shows the 
result. The feature phone has diffused much faster than the built-in camera. 
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Figure 19: Previous phone features’ adoption curves shifted forward in time. 
By extrapolating these shapes to catch up with the logistic and Gompertz func-
tions, we get forecasts based on historical feature adoption data.  
We choose the logistic function as a basis for the optimistic scenario because of 
its better fit and more credible forecast for eventual penetration, although, the 
function values during the study period, from 2007 to 2011, are quite similar. 
From the two feature curves, we choose the built-in camera, since its curve is less 
vertical and since it resembles DVB-H in the sense that, when it was introduced, 
it required a better screen and more memory from the mobile phone, and sold at a 
significantly higher price. 
We then build the optimistic scenario so that we let the DVB-H diffusion start 
with same curve as built-in camera did, and then extrapolate the curve to catch up 
with smartphone diffusion forecast based on logistic model. The optimistic sce-
nario forecasts 50% penetration at the end of 2011. 
Average and pessimistic forecasts 
To get the average and pessimistic scenario we do not use any actual data. In-
stead, we choose applicable parameters by hand for two Gompertz functions, so 
that the resulting curves represent downscaled versions of the optimistic forecast. 
The average and pessimistic functions are pure Gompertz functions, whereas the 
optimistic forecast is a mixture of a logistic function and actual diffusion data of 
built-in camera. Figure 20 below shows the resulting different DVB-H diffusion 
scenarios side by side.  
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Figure 20: Handset adoption forecasts. 
The average scenario forecasts around 24% penetration at the end of 2011. The 
figure for the pessimistic scenario is 12%. We can think of the normal scenario as 
the result of the mobile TV being left in a kind of multimedia handset category. 
Similarly, we can think of the pessimistic scenario as the result of mobile TV 
staying a niche feature or, alternatively, as the lack of demand resulting from poor 
pricing, low quality content, or strongly weakening socio-economic conditions. 
3.6.4 Service demand 
Now that we have estimates for the DVB-H handset adoption, we can construct a 
model of the market demand for channel packages. As Carlsson and Walden 
(2007) write, the drivers for the demand for mobile TV so far are close to un-
known – apart from the idea that most people would likely prefer flat, under-
standable pricing and good content. 
In the calculation model, we handle the demand for channel packages separately 
from other TV services and interactive services. We apply a simple differential 
pricing approach for the channel packages, and set a rough market penetration es-
timate and average consumer spending per year (ARPU) for all other services. 
Initial demand data 
Although forecasting the market demand for a mobile service such as mobile TV 
is predominantly about guessing, we can resort to some recent consumer data 
gathered in various studies.  
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Mäki (2005) reports the results of a survey conducted during the Finnish mobile 
TV pilot in 2005. The sample consisted of 486 persons living in the capital re-
gion. They were given a DVB-H enabled handset and were shown mainly simul-
casts of regular DVB-T channels against a monthly flat rate of EUR 4.90. Ac-
cording to the survey results: 
• Around 40% of participants said that they would be ready to pay EUR 10 
per month. 
• Around 1% of participants said that they would subscribe to the services as 
soon as they are available, and further 14% said that they would subscribe 
when acquiring their next new mobile phone. These people typically owned 
a smartphone or a phone with built-in camera. 
• Around 26% of participants said that they would subscribe when services 
would be more common. 
• Overall, a fixed monthly fee would be preferred. 
Verkasalo (2007) reports the results of a smartphone usage study conducted in 
Finland during fall 2006. The study combines actual usage data recorded by a 
piece of software installed on participants’ smartphones, related user surveys, and 
network measurements. The sample size in the study was 695 Nokia smartphone 
users, and average duration of participation was 68 days. The results include the 
following observations: 
• Around 13% of all smartphone users in the sample at least tried multimedia 
streaming over WCDMA or GPRS. The percentage was from 19% to 32% 
for people who considered themselves as experienced smartphone users. 
• Around 3% of smartphone users in the sample used or tried WCDMA 
streaming mobile TV service.  
• Around 70% of sample had purchased content using a mobile phone. 
Around 32% had purchased goods or services. 
• Finland lags behind Western Europe and USA in mobile video usage. 
Carlsson and Walden (2007) conducted two surveys about the attitudes of Finnish 
consumers towards mobile TV during 2005. Their samples consisted of 600 ran-
domly picked consumers from around Finland and of 160 participants of the Fin-
nish mobile TV pilot: 
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• Around 15% of people in the random group indicated interest to try mobile 
TV in the future (compared to 59% in an 8-country study by Siemens, and 
90% in a study about Korea). 
• Around 29% of people in the pilot group developed a daily routine of 
watching mobile TV. 
• Around 17% of people in the pilot group had a positive attitude toward mo-
bile TV. Around 29% had a neutral attitude, and around 44% had a nega-
tive attitude. 
The results of these user surveys are opinions of a certain sample rather than ac-
tual buying decisions. Moreover, single measurements of recently launched video 
streaming services do not indicate which way the market is developing. 
Information goods and differential pricing 
Shapiro and Varian (1999) define information as something that can be digitised, 
i.e., expressed in a stream of bits. An information good is a type of commodity 
whose market value derives from the information it contains. Typical examples of 
information goods are a CD containing pieces of music, and a newspaper. In this 
thesis, we then consider mobile TV programmes, channels, and channel packages 
as information goods. 
According to Varian (1997), a well-known feature of an information good is that 
it has large fixed cost of production, and small variable cost of reproduction. It 
therefore makes little sense to price information goods based on costs. Rather, in-
formation goods should be priced based on consumer value. Since consumers can 
have radically different values for a particular information good, value based 
pricing naturally leads to differential pricing, i.e., price discrimination. The pur-
pose of differential pricing, from the perspective of the seller of the information 
good, is to maximise revenues by extracting as much value from the market as 
possible.  
In this thesis, we apply a differential pricing approach called versioning, also 
known as vertical differentiation and second-degree price discrimination. This 
approach refers to a situation in which a seller provides different quali-
ties/versions of a good, which sell at different prices. The seller cannot set the 
price for the product according to any exogenous observable characteristic such 
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as affiliation with some group, but can set the price based on an endogenous 
characteristic such as the quality of the version the consumer purchases. (Varian 
1997) 
The seller wants to price the versions so that the consumers with high willingness 
to pay (WTP) choose a high quality version at a higher price, and consumers with 
low WTP choose a lower quality version at a lower price. Versioning thus en-
ables the process of customer self-selection, in which customers sort themselves 
into different groups (segments) according to their WTP. (Varian 1997) 
Channel bundling 
Shapiro and Varian (1999) define bundling as a special form of price discrimina-
tion in which two or more distinct products, which are also available separately, 
are offered as a package at a single price. If the products cannot be bought sepa-
rately, the conduct is called tying.  
Literature suggests that bundling of information goods can be valuable as it re-
duces the dispersion in the consumers’ WTP. This means that the consumers’ 
valuation for a bundle of goods typically has a probability distribution with a 
lower variance per good compared to the valuations for the individual goods. 
Such reduction in buyer diversity typically helps sellers extract higher profits 
from all consumers. (Shapiro and Varian 1999, Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999) 
According to Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999), the larger the number of goods 
bundled, the greater the typical reduction in the variance of consumers’ valuation, 
as Figure 21 below shows. Their model assumes linear demand and independent 
and identically distributed consumer valuations. 
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Figure 21: Demand for bundles of information goods (Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999). 
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Moreover, practically all of the experts we interviewed said that the mobile TV 
channels ought to be sold in channel bundles, i.e., channel packages, as it would 
be easier and perhaps more cost effective than selling single channels. Moreover, 
bundling a channel subscription together with a DVB-H handset and a mobile 
subscription was seen as a good way to advance DVB-H. 
Rautio, Anttila, and Tuominen (2007) have studied bundling of information 
goods in Finland. Their results do not support anticipated advantages of bundling 
very strongly, but bundling did reduce the dispersion in customer valuations and 
increased demand of information goods slightly. Another finding is that consum-
ers in Finland strongly prefer flat rate pricing. 
Therefore, we build the model so that broadcast service operators offer channel 
packages at flat monthly rates, and the number of channel packages ranges from 
one to three, depending on the capability of the operator. Varian (1997) suggests 
that in the absence of additional information, having three versions rather than 
one or two may be attractive due to “extremeness aversion” on the part of con-
sumers. This means that when presented with three different versions of a good, 
e.g. a microwave oven, a consumer often chooses the middle-priced one. 
We name the three possible channel packages as, from cheapest to most expen-
sive, bronze, silver, and gold. The number of channels in a channel package is 
limited by the rule of maximum 1/3 of total capacity per player and the maximum 
channel capacity of the network. The price of a channel package correlates posi-
tively with the number of channels in the package. The subscribers then naturally 
sort themselves into bronze, silver, and gold segments based on their willingness 
to pay and package choice. 
Feature based demand model for channel packages 
We apply Varian (1997) and Dedeke (2002) to derive a demand function for 
channel packages. In the model, a service operator employs versioning, or quality 
based price differentiation, so that more channels in a package means more qual-
ity and a higher price. The word quality here refers to the features or capability of 
the package, namely the number of channels, but also to the quality of the con-
tent.  
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We build the offering in the model so that the cheapest package, bronze, has x 
channels. The middle-price silver package has x + y channels, and the high-price 
gold package has x + y + z channels. Thus, when a consumer subscribes to the sil-
ver package, she actually buys the bronze package plus the additional silver 
channels. The gold package then, if offered, always has the most and bronze 
package the least channels. 
We then assume that at each price, the demand for silver package is larger than 
for bronze package, since silver package has the same channels as bronze plus the 
additional channels. Therefore, if both bronze and silver would cost EUR 10, 
every rational consumer would choose silver. We thus further assume a certain 
level of rationality to be present among consumers in the calculation model. 
For simplicity, we assume that the demand curves for the channel packages are 
linear. Figure 22 below illustrates the demand model. The curves are not to scale 
in this illustration. 
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Figure 22: Examples of demand curves for channel packages, not to scale. 
We approximate the demand curve of a channel package using and equation pro-
ducing a linear demand curve: 
q(a,b,p,c,d) = (a - b*p) - c - d 
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Where: 
q = quantity as a fraction of DVB-H adopters. 
a = point where the curve intersects the horizontal axis when c = 0 and d = 0. 
b = slope of the curve. 
p = monthly subscription price of channel package. 
c = effect of the most important simulcasts being free. 
d = adjustment for effects of marketing. 
One piece of market information we can use to shape the curve is that according 
to the Helsinki pilot survey, around 40% the participants said they would pay 
EUR 10 per month for the service. The offered service in the pilot was a channel 
package that included simulcasts and some extra channels. We can regard the pi-
lot survey’s result as the absolute maximum demand for a base channel package, 
as we consider the pilot users as a biased group and as a price stated as appropri-
ate in a survey can prove much too high in real world situations. Then, by locking 
the point (q, p) = (40%, EUR 10), and by specifying an appropriate range for pa-
rameter a, we get maximum demand levels.  
We assume that if the most popular commercial free-TV simulcasts (MTV3, 
Nelonen, and SubTV according to Statistics Finland 2006b) were included in a 
pay-TV package, the demand for the pay-TV package would be higher than in the 
case that these simulcasts were free for consumers. This effect is denoted by pa-
rameter c. We also assume that, to some extent, marketing efforts can affect the 
demand positively. We approximate the effect of marketing efforts so that the 
higher the marketing spending, the more the curve moves to right. This effect is 
denoted by parameter d. 
Figure 23 below shows a curtain of curves, which act as the upper limit for mar-
ket demand of the bronze channel package (left side), and a curtain of all possible 
demand curves we create with the demand model by specifying suitable parame-
ter ranges (right side). 
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Figure 23: Construction of demand curves. 
The resulting range of possible demand curves is wide, and by combining this 
range with the three handset adoption forecasts, we get an abundant number of 
possibilities for the popularity of mobile TV channel packages among consumers. 
We treat the set of possible curves neutrally and set the parameter ranges, which 
determine the demand function, as uniformly distributed. 
We form the silver and gold package demand by scaling parameter a in the 
bronze package’s demand curve so that if silver package exists and has more 
channels than bronze, its curve is always higher. Similarly, gold curve is always 
above silver curve. We correlate the increase in parameter a with the number of 
extra channels, so that the more extra channels, the greater the increase. 
Channel package pricing 
Now that we have modelled the market demand for channel packages, we can 
model a matching pricing plan for a service operator so that a service operator 
sets a target penetration and a minimum price for each channel package it sells. 
The operator then in effect segments its DVB-H enabled customers into from one 
to three segments (based on the number of packages offered) and into non-
buyers. This approach is not intelligent in the sense that it does not optimise the 
results for profit maximisation or loss minimisation.  
Table 18 below shows the number of channel packages offered in each different 
operating model when simulcasts are free and when they are not free for the con-
sumers. The numbers are based on our estimates of the capability of the operator 
types. 
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Table 18: Number of pay-TV channel packages offered by service operator. 
Operating model Number of channel 
packages. 
Simulcasts are free / 
are not free. 
1. MNO approach 2 / 2 
2. MVNO approach 1 / 2 
3. Broadcaster approach with outsourced billing 2 / 2 
4. Broadcaster approach with in-house pay-TV billing 2 / 2 
5. Pay-TV broadcaster with outsourced billing 2 / 2 
6. Co-operation approach, MNO with broadcasters 3 / 3 
7. Co-operation approach, MVNO with broadcasters 3 / 3 
 
The target penetration depends on the steepness of the demand curve so that the 
steeper the demand curve, the lower the target penetration. Table 19 below shows 
the target penetration ranges we estimate for the different channel packages. 
Table 19: Target penetration ranges for channel packages. 
Target penetrations Channel package 
If simulcasts are free If simulcasts are not free 
Bronze 30% - 50% 60% - 80% 
Silver 10% - 18% 16% - 25% 
Gold 3% - 6% 6% - 8% 
 
The calculation model then reads a price that corresponds to the target penetration 
on the demand curve. If the indicated price is lower than the minimum price, the 
calculation model uses the minimum price instead. The minimum price for the 
bronze channel package is set to range from EUR 3 to EUR 5, and for silver and 
gold packages from EUR 3 to EUR 5 and from EUR 2 to EUR 4 respectively. 
The minimum prices correlate with the number of channels so that the more 
channels there are in a package, the higher the minimum price in general. 
Note that the actual percentage of people subscribing to bronze channel package 
is calculated as bronze penetration minus silver penetration minus gold penetra-
tion, and so forth. Figure 22 on page 77 shows an example of this so that the seg-
ment QBronze in the figure indicates the actual penetration. 
Channel package revenues 
We need three further considerations to calculate the channel package revenues: 
the service operator’s market share of all DVB-H adopters, the average number of 
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months people subscribe to the channel packages per year, and the dealing with 
customers with bundled handsets.  
We set the service operator market share to 30% for a vertically integrated mobile 
operator, to 10% for an MVNO, and to 50% for a broadcaster type of service op-
erator. The interpretation of the market share is slightly different for mobile op-
erators and broadcasters, making the operating models non-comparable: a mobile 
operator will sell services only to its own mobile subscribers, but a broadcaster 
can sell its services through many mobile operators. E.g., MVNO then reaches a 
maximum of 10% of all DVB-H handset adopters assuming that they are uni-
formly distributed to all mobile operators. A broadcaster with 50% market share 
serves 50% of all DVB-H handset adopters through its sales channel partners. 
We set the average number of months people subscribe to the channel packages 
per year to range from 6 to 12 months. For simplicity, we assume that the unit 
length of a subscription is one month. If a consumer chooses to buy a one-month 
subscription of a channel package, there is no guarantee that she or he would buy 
it the next month. Moreover, people might choose not to renew their subscrip-
tions during e.g. holiday seasons. 
We model the customers with bundled handsets so that they always get a channel 
package along with the handset. To determine the channel package choice for 
bundled customers we use the division of channel packages among the normal 
customers. Note that also the bundled customers can choose not to continue their 
mobile TV subscriptions each month, i.e., they do not have to subscribe to the 
services for 12 months per year. 
We can then finally calculate the annual channel package revenue using the equa-
tion: 
Ri = P * E(i-t) * Q * Ni * M * T 
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Where: 
Ri = revenue in year i. 
P = monthly price excluding VAT 22%. 
E = channel package annual price erosion. 
t = channel package launch year. 
Q = share of DVB-H handset adopters subscribing to the channel package. 
Ni = number of DVB-H adopters in year i. 
M = service operator’s market share. 
T = average number of months subscribed per year. 
The price erosion factor ranges from 98% to 100%, i.e., the annual price erosion 
is at maximum 2%. The service operator can also impose a connection tariff for 
new customers. Each new customer must pay the tariff once when she or he sub-
scribes to any channel package for the first time. We set the connection tariff to 
range from EUR 0 to EUR 10, with the exception that customers with bundled 
handsets do not have to pay a connection tariff. 
In addition, we must consider the channel package launch years. The calculation 
model assumes that bronze channel package exists from the beginning of study 
period, but silver and gold channel packages can be launched between 2007 and 
2009. We approximate the launch date to be on average in the middle of the 
launch year. Therefore, we calculate the costs and revenues for silver and gold 
channel packages only for the second half of the launch year. 
Demand and revenues for other services 
We model the demand for other services more straightforwardly. For each ser-
vice, we multiply two parameters: the market penetration and the annual average 
revenue per user (ARPU). Table 20 below lists the parameter values we use in the 
calculation model. 
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Table 20: Market penetration and spending parameters for other services. 
Service Market penetration Annual 
ARPU, EUR 
Pay-TV subscription 5%...30% of DVB-H handset owners 2…10 
Pay-TV Pay-per-View 5%...30% of DVB-H handset owners 2…10 
3G Streaming VoD 5%...20% of channel package subscribers 2…10 
Interactive: Communications  10%...30% of channel pack subscribers 2…10 
Interactive: Premium SMS 3%...20% of channel package subscribers 2…10 
Interactive: personalisation 3%...20% of channel package subscribers 1…10 
Interactive: E-commerce 1%...5% of channel package subscribers 2…10 
Interactive: applications and 
filecasting 
1%...5% of channel package subscribers 1…5 
 
3.7 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, we have discussed elements we have to consider in constructing 
the ECOSYS calculation model, from the business ecosystem emerging around 
DVB-H mobile TV in Finland to the regulative, technology, service, and envi-
ronmental scenarios. 
In the regulative scenario, we have discussed laws and licences regulating DVB-
H broadcast network operation, service operation, mobile network operation, and 
broadcasting in Finland to the degree that they affect the ecosystem and the calcu-
lation model.  
In the technology scenario, we have presented the DVB-H network structure and 
the required service system elements for delivering DVB-H mobile TV services. 
We have also discussed the technical service capability of the DVB-H network in 
Finland. 
In the service scenario, we have presented the different services we consider in 
the calculation model, as well as a set of different operating models for service 
operators we derive from the business ecosystem. 
In the environmental scenario, we have presented a rough DVB-H network di-
mensioning, as well as constructed three handset adoption forecasts and a demand 
model for DVB-H pay-TV channel packages and other services.  
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4 Results of techno-economic analysis 
In this chapter, we present the results of the techno-economic analysis of DVB-H 
mobile TV operating models. We calculate the results for each of the seven oper-
ating models with two options for simulcasts (free or not free for end users) and 
three different handset adoption forecasts (optimistic, average, and pessimistic). 
The total number of calculation cases is then 7 * 2 * 3 = 42. Table 21 below 
shows the different configurations. 
Table 21: Configurations of different calculation cases. 
Operating model Simulcasts for  
consumers 
Handset adoption 
forecast model 
1. MNO approach - Free - Not free 
- Optimistic 
- Average 
- Pessimistic 
2. MVNO approach - Free - Not free 
- Optimistic 
- Average 
- Pessimistic 
3. Broadcaster approach with outsourced billing (indirect) - Free - Not free 
- Optimistic 
- Average 
- Pessimistic 
4. Broadcaster approach with in-house pay-TV billing (direct) - Free - Not free 
- Optimistic 
- Average 
- Pessimistic 
5. Pay-TV broadcaster with outsourced billing - Free - Not free 
- Optimistic 
- Average 
- Pessimistic 
6. Co-operation approach, MNO with broadcasters - Free - Not free 
- Optimistic 
- Average 
- Pessimistic 
7. Co-operation approach, MVNO with broadcasters - Free - Not free 
- Optimistic 
- Average 
- Pessimistic 
 
We perform 1,000 Monte Carlo simulation runs for each of the 42 calculation 
cases and present the results separately for mobile operator based and broadcaster 
based operating models, since the cases are not entirely comparable. 
The mobile operator based operating models are the MNO and MVNO ap-
proaches and the two co-operation approaches, i.e., models 1, 2, 6, and 7. The 
broadcaster based operating models are the direct and indirect broadcaster ap-
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proaches and the pay-TV broadcaster approach, i.e., models 3, 4, and 5. All mod-
els have the same discount rate of 8% despite the possibly varying level of risk 
between the models, which calls for considering also the risks included in differ-
ent operating models when interpreting the results. 
The calculation model does not optimise the results for profit maximisation or 
loss minimisation. In other words, the model cannot e.g. adjust the number of 
channels or pricing according to market demand, or discontinue the services even 
when the project looks incurably unprofitable. On the contrary, the calculation 
model runs a service operator through the 5-year study period with 1,000 differ-
ent combinations of simulated market demand, service offering, pricing, and op-
erating costs, and returns the average, best, and worst outcomes along with other 
statistical data. 
Therefore, more important than the numeric values of single cases or operating 
models is the overall ranking of the operating models against each other accord-
ing to their economic performance prospects. The ranking, based on comparing 
the expected NPV results, deviation, and extremes, reveals which operating mod-
els have the best performance in a variety of conditions.  
4.1 Mobile operator as service operator 
Figure 24 and Figure 25 below show the NPV results for mobile operator (MNO 
or MVNO) based operating models. We arrange the different operating models in 
accordance to their overall performance in descending order.  
The blue bars represent the mean NPV of the business case. There are three blue 
bars for each operating model, portraying the three different handset adoption 
cases: optimistic, average, and pessimistic. The associated error bars represent the 
extremes of NPV, i.e., the best and worst outcomes. Best outcome generally oc-
curs when service demand is high, service pricing is closest to optimal, and oper-
ating costs are low. Worst outcome naturally occurs in the opposite conditions. 
Numeric NPV results and density distributions are included as appendix A and B 
respectively.  
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Figure 24: Results for mobile operator and co-op. approaches when simulcasts are free. 
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Figure 25: Results for mobile operator and co-op. approaches when simulcasts are not free. 
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We can see that the co-operation approach is easiest-to-implement for a mobile 
operator, since it takes care of only sales and marketing, leaving broadcasters to 
bear the major risks, i.e., capacity and programming. However, the upside poten-
tial of the co-operation model is consequently limited. The co-operation model 
seems to be only slightly affected by the simulcast being free or not free to con-
sumers. 
The largest potential for creating value seems to be in the MNO approach. This 
model however involves buying DVB-H capacity for the services and is therefore 
much more risky than the co-operation model, causing a wide spread of results. 
The results also vary considerably between different handset forecasts from opti-
mistic to pessimistic, implying a large dependence on the number of DVB-H 
adopters. In addition, the MNO approach seems to be greatly affected by the si-
mulcasts being free or not free to consumers. Being able to bundle simulcasts and 
pay-TV channels together into a channel package can then be a potential value 
driver for mobile operators. 
For a MVNO the business case seems worse. The small market share (10%) 
means that acting as a broadcaster and buying capacity would likely destroy 
value, although there is a slight chance of positive NPV when simulcasts are not 
free and handset adoption forecast is optimistic. 
In these mobile operator based approaches, average revenue per user (ARPU) for 
channel package subscribers ranges from around EUR 2 to EUR 12 per month for 
the five-year study period. ARPU for all DVB-H enabled customers ranges from 
EUR 1 to EUR 8. The lower ends of the ARPU ranges occur when average sub-
scription length is at its lowest (6 months per year). 
Note that a mobile network operator can also get network infrastructure leasing 
revenues, which are not included in the above numbers, as they might not be pur-
ely incremental cash flows. The infrastructure leasing in the calculation model 
does not correlate with handset adoption forecasts, and affects only the mobile 
network operators, not MVNOs or broadcasters. The NPV of infrastructure leas-
ing for the five-year period ranges from MEUR 1 to MEUR 2. 
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4.2 Broadcaster as service operator 
Figure 26 and Figure 27 below show the NPV results for broadcaster based oper-
ating models. We arrange the different operating models in accordance to their 
overall performance in descending order, the blue bars representing the mean 
NPV of the business case and the associated error bars representing the extremes.  
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Figure 26: Results for broadcaster approaches when simulcasts are free. 
Mean NPV [MEUR] and extremes.
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Figure 27: Results for broadcaster approaches when simulcasts are not free. 
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The results for broadcaster approaches in general have considerably wide spreads, 
implying that there is a high risk associated with buying DVB-H capacity and 
programming for the channel packages. The differences between handset adop-
tion forecasts and the wide ranges between best and worst outcomes indicate that 
the models are very sensitive to the number of handset adopters and to the market 
demand for pay-TV channel packages. 
The simulcasts being free or not free seems to have a notable influence on broad-
caster approaches, however smaller than on the MNO approach that we discussed 
earlier. The reason for this might be in broadcasters being able to get advertising 
revenues with free-TV channels. Moreover, one broadcaster might not be able or 
willing to sell the simulcasts of other, competing broadcasters in its packages. 
The direct broadcaster approach seems to do slightly better than the indirect, es-
pecially when simulcasts are free. This is because billing through mobile operator 
can be much more expensive than through other sales channels, e.g. a credit card 
transaction over the Internet. This indicates a possible conflict of interest between 
mobile operators and broadcasters. Yet bypassing mobile operators in such man-
ner may prove difficult in reality. 
This result is in line with the findings of Braet et al. (2006), who write that reve-
nue sharing schemes might turn out to be suboptimal for content aggregators, 
which neither own spectrum nor have direct customer ownership, as other parties 
can divide lion’s share of the revenues. 
The pay-TV broadcaster approach, in which billing always goes through mobile 
operator, seems the most difficult, especially when simulcasts are free. The mar-
ket demand might not support buying large amounts of capacity for pay-TV chan-
nels. Moreover, if simulcasts are not free, mobile operators selling the pay-TV 
broadcaster‘s content can bundle the pay-TV channel packages with some simul-
casts making the sales easier. 
In these broadcaster based approaches, average revenue per user (ARPU) for 
channel package subscribers ranges from around EUR 3 to EUR 12 per month for 
the five-year study period. ARPU for all DVB-H handset adopters ranges from 
EUR 1 to EUR 5. The lower ends of the ARPU ranges occur when average sub-
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scription length is at its lowest (6 months per year). Note that these ARPU’s do 
not include advertising revenue. 
4.3 Sensitivity analysis 
We already know from the results that the handset adoption forecast is a major 
contributor to the distribution of NPV values. To analyse the sensitivity of the 
calculation model further, we can measure the correlation of different parameters 
with NPV, i.e., how much NPV changes together with a given parameter.  
To assess parameter correlations we use Spearman's rank correlation. To calcu-
late Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, parameter values and corresponding 
NPV results are replaced with their rankings from lowest value to highest value 
using the integers 1 to N (ordinal variables: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc.) prior to computing 
the correlation coefficient. A rank correlation coefficient is in the interval [-1,1], 
where 1 indicates a perfect agreement between the two compared rankings, -1 in-
dicates a perfect disagreement, and 0 indicates a complete independence. Increas-
ing rank correlation coefficient values between -1 and 1 indicate increasing 
agreement between the rankings.  
To analyse the vast amount of sensitivity data collected in the Monte Carlo simu-
lation runs, we choose to group similar operating model cases together into three 
groups: mobile operator approaches, broadcaster approaches, and co-operation 
approaches. The calculated correlations then represent averages over a group in-
stead of a single case. Note that the correlation coefficients may not be com-
pletely reliable because certain parameter values are set to correlate with each 
other already in the calculation model. Therefore, a low-importance parameter 
that is set to correlate with a high-importance parameter may get a high correla-
tion coefficient. Moreover, taking averages over the groups may cause losing 
some sensitivity data. 
Figure 28, Figure 29, and Figure 30 below represent the top 20 parameter correla-
tions for the different groups in descending order. An asterisk (*) before a pa-
rameter name signifies that the same parameter appears in top 20 for two groups, 
and two asterisks (**) signify that the same parameter appears in top 20 for all 
three groups.  
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Figure 28: Parameter rank correlation with NPV in mobile operator approaches. 
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Figure 29: Parameter rank correlation with NPV in broadcaster approaches. 
Top 20 parameter rank correlations in co-op approaches
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Figure 30: Parameter rank correlation with NPV in co-operation approaches. 
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Only three parameters appear in all groups’ top 20 sensitive parameters: average 
duration of channel package subscriptions, annual growth/reduction factor of 
marketing spending, and start year of silver channel package service. The average 
duration of channel package subscriptions is a central parameter in revenue calcu-
lation and has a wide range in proportion to its maximum value: from 6 to 12 
months. Marketing spending is also a major cost item in all operating models, and 
especially in co-operation models, where the mobile operator does not buy DVB-
H capacity itself. The start year of silver channel package having a positive rank 
correlation signifies that it is better to start offering another channel package 
closer to 2009 than 2007 – the cost of the required extra capacity is too high at 
low DVB-H handset penetration levels. 
Mobile operator approaches and broadcaster approaches seem to be very sensitive 
to all parameters associated with the silver channel package, perhaps signifying a 
strong dependence on the pricing of DVB-H capacity and TV programming – 
many of the parameters are however set to correlate with each other or other pa-
rameters already in the calculation model, which can affect the rankings.  
The negative correlation of eventual DVB-H network coverage for mobile opera-
tor and broadcaster approaches signifies that the associated increase in capacity 
price might cancel the benefits of increase in potential market size.  
It is also notable that the mobile operator models are not very sensitive to handset 
sales or handset bundling, but increase in DVB-H handset bundling seems to 
have a positive effect on NPV. 
The co-operation approaches differ from the two other groups in that there are no 
channel capacity related costs, and effect of early marketing spending and its de-
velopment is significant. The revenue share of the mobile operator is also a sensi-
tive parameter. 
Note that advertising revenue is not built with parameters similarly as other reve-
nue generating services and is therefore not included in the above parameter rank 
correlations. 
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4.4 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, we have covered the results of the techno-economic analysis of 
DVB-H mobile TV operating models for mobile operators and broadcasters as 
well as conducted a sensitivity analysis of the results on parameter level.  
Overall, the NPV results do not indicate that DVB-H mobile TV would be a tre-
mendous value creation opportunity for mobile operators or broadcasters in 
Finland during the first five years. 
The co-operation approach seems to be least risky and easiest for mobile opera-
tors, since broadcasters would bear the DVB-H capacity risk and provide pro-
gramming, whereas mobile operator would take care of sales and marketing of 
the services to consumers. The highest upside potential for mobile operators 
seems to be in MNO approach in which mobile operator would take also the 
broadcaster’s role and buy required DVB-H capacity and programming. This 
model however is associated with considerably higher risks. 
For broadcasters, the best operating model seems to be in selling DVB-H services 
directly to consumers, bypassing mobile operators (direct broadcaster approach), 
since mobile operators take a large share of the revenues for billing. This indi-
cates a possible conflict of interest between the two key parties. However, by-
passing mobile operators can prove difficult in reality. A broadcaster selling only 
pay-TV services through mobile operators (pay-TV broadcaster approach) seems 
to be the most difficult case. 
Apart from DVB-H capacity, the most influential factors for the operating models 
seem to be the DVB-H handset adoption forecast, channel package market de-
mand, and the duration of channel package subscriptions per year. Marketing re-
lated costs are also significant. 
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5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we discuss further the results of the techno-economic analysis of 
DVB-H operating models, the reliability and validity of the results, and possibili-
ties for exploitation of the results in practice. We also discuss briefly some possi-
ble items for future research. 
5.1 Results 
Overall, it seems that DVB-H mobile TV will not be a tremendous value creation 
opportunity, let alone the next ‘killer application’, for mobile operators or broad-
casters in Finland, at least during the first five years. The results then support the 
dominant expectations of the interviewed experts. 
For mobile operators, the least risky and easiest-to-implement operating model 
seems to be co-operating with broadcasters to bring the DVB-H services to mar-
ket. According to the proposed model, broadcasters would buy the required ca-
pacity as well as provide the programming, while mobile operators would take 
care of sales and marketing of the new services to consumers.  
The foremost upside potential for both mobile operators and broadcasters would 
be in performing also the other party’s role, that is, a mobile operator becoming a 
DVB-H broadcaster (MNO approach) or a broadcaster selling DVB-H services 
directly to consumers, bypassing mobile operators (direct broadcaster approach). 
These operating models are, however, associated with considerably higher risks. 
The results then indicate a possible conflict of interest between the two key par-
ties regarding the sharing of costs and potential revenues. 
However, it is unlikely that mobile operators would start buying capacity or that 
broadcasters could bypass mobile operators in reality. There are economies of 
scale in broadcasting, and a small mobile operator does not have the scale or the 
competence to beat broadcasters in the business of offering quality content. Simi-
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larly, mobile operators already send a bill each month to their customers and are 
used to billing only tiny amounts. Building a comparable billing system could 
prove very time consuming and expensive for broadcasters. Therefore, the co-
operation approach would seem the most likely scenario in Finland. 
Yet a major issue for the ecosystem in Finland is who pays for the DVB-H capac-
ity. Broadcasters see that they already reach the whole population through con-
ventional TV, and that in the first years DVB-H would not yield any significant 
advertising revenues. Buying DVB-H capacity would then only deteriorate the 
current operating margins of the TV channels. It is then likely that broadcasters 
might want to wait for there to be more handsets in the market first, deepening 
the ‘chicken and egg’ dilemma. 
Note that both broadcasters and mobile operators have already accumulated sunk 
costs with DVB-H background work, trials, and negotiations during the last 5 
years or so. These sunk costs are not included in the analysis and actually should 
not affect the decisions whether to go ahead or not. 
In addition, the horizontal operating model reduces the chances of service differ-
entiation for mobile operators, as is not feasible for a TV channel to be restricted 
to the customers of only one mobile operator when distribution (capacity) costs 
are fixed and number of consumers with DVB-H handsets is small. Therefore, 
operators participating in DVB-H will likely offer the same basic TV channels 
and some additional pay-TV channels. 
5.2 Assessment of results 
The primary objectives of this thesis have been to construct a techno-economic 
model of the DVB-H service business ecosystem and to use it for assessing the 
feasibility of the business case and for ranking different business models. The 
secondary objective of this thesis has been to gain more understanding of the re-
lated technical, economic, and regulative issues, and to develop further the means 
of conducting a techno-economic analysis of a service business case. Having pro-
vided the needed results and built a high-level view of the business ecosystem 
and its major technical, economic, and regulative constraints, we can conclude 
that the thesis more or less achieves both its primary and secondary objectives. 
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As a part of the research process, we have identified the key roles and interactions 
in the DVB-H business ecosystem. The calculation model we have built for the 
analysis is based on these roles and interactions as well as a number of regulative, 
technical, and economic conditions. Yet the calculation model has to make rough 
simplifications of reality in many aspects. It for instance assumes linear service 
demand curves and constant growth or reduction rates for many OPEX elements. 
Moreover, the calculation model is not intelligent in the sense that it cannot opti-
mise for profit maximisation or loss minimisation. 
The calculation model nevertheless produces results that are both logical and in 
line with the expectations of majority of the interviewed experts. We can there-
fore say that the ECOSYS methodology has proved applicable for evaluating 
such service business case and that reproducing the operating model study con-
ducted in this thesis would yield similar results and conclusions.  
The results, although being based on a consistent and tested techno-economic ap-
proach, are still predictions about the future, and thus by definition uncertain. To 
improve the validity of the results, we have built the calculation model so that it 
considers uncertainty already at parameter level and so that it allows testing thou-
sands of combinations of different parameter values to identify sensitivities. The 
calculation model itself has also been built on a number of assumptions about the 
structures of cost and revenue elements. Especially some of the operating cost 
elements are modelled vaguely, and the weight of marketing may be overesti-
mated. These underlying assumptions related to the calculation logic (formulas 
etc.) constitute possible sources of systematic error in the calculation. Evaluating 
the magnitude of this systematic error is however difficult, since there is no com-
parable data available. 
For the above reasons, we have been careful in making conclusions about the best 
operating models for mobile operators and broadcasters, and have used mainly 
the overall performance rankings rather than any single parameters or NPV fig-
ures. 
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Note that the results of this thesis are based on simulated market conditions rep-
resenting the Finnish market, and cannot be directly generalised to any other set-
tings or markets. 
5.3 Exploitation of results 
Parties interested in providing DVB-H mobile TV services have likely conducted 
their own profitability calculations for internal use. In this thesis, we have pro-
vided a public and impartial assessment of the business case from service opera-
tor viewpoint, partly based on discussions and interviews with experts from dif-
ferent sides of the ecosystem. 
Mobile operators, broadcasters, and other parties interested in DVB-H mobile TV 
business can use the results for reference and comparison with their own calcula-
tions. More importantly, our results can provide avenues for new discussions be-
tween the parties. 
5.4 Items for future research 
This thesis studies the cash flows of DVB-H mobile TV services with a high level 
of abstraction about the underlying business ecosystem. The study also concen-
trates on mobile operators and broadcasters as the service operators. 
The current calculation model does not optimise the service offering and pricing 
for profit maximisation. Designing for instance more accurate demand models 
and an adaptive supply function for a service operator would make the calculation 
model more ‘intelligent’ and more realistic. This would refine the outcomes by 
accepting only healthy combinations. Another improvement could be evaluating 
the business case using real option approach to see how the operating models 
would perform if operations were e.g. delayed for some time. 
It would be also beneficial to study further the relative powers and capabilities of 
all players involved in service delivery. This could help in choosing optimal busi-
ness models, designing the best mobile TV value proposition, and determining 
the viability of the business ecosystem as a whole. 
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6 Further discussion and final remarks 
In this chapter, we discuss the relationship between streaming mobile TV and 
broadcast mobile TV as well as the general outlook of DVB-H services in 
Finland and on a global scale. 
6.1 Streaming vs. broadcast mobile TV 
Mobile TV services are already available in Finland through WCDMA or GPRS 
unicast streaming. So why build another network?  
The problem with unicast streaming is twofold. First, it does not scale. Current 
streaming usage is low and there is idle capacity in the mobile data networks, but 
if more and more users would sign up, network resources would quickly become 
congested and service quality would degrade.  
Second, mobile operator revenue per megabyte in video streaming is very low 
compared to some simpler services, leading to uneconomical use of expensive 
wireless capacity. If we consider a person watching 96 kbps streaming mobile TV 
half an hour per day, the amount of data transferred during a month would be 650 
MB – yet the price could be as low as EUR 10, i.e., around EUR 0.015 per MB. 
This example might be quite an extreme case, but Table 22 below lists typical 
revenues per megabyte for various mobile services. 
Table 22: Revenue per megabyte for different mobile services 
Service Size, MB Typical  
revenue, 
EUR 
Revenue / 
MB, EUR 
SMS 0.00014 0.10 714.29 
MMS 0.010 0.38 38.00 
1 min. voice call 0.141 0.08 0.57 
3 min. low quality video stream (120 kbps) 2.7 2.00 0.74 
3 min. high quality video stream (384 kbps) 8.6 3.00 0.35 
30 min. low quality video stream (120 kbps) 27 5.00 0.19 
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We can see that in this sense SMS is the crown jewel of mobile services, whereas 
video services make much less profitable use of the bandwidth. As mobile opera-
tors must recover the bandwidth costs from their subscribers, and as the band-
width is unlikely to become cheaper in the future because of physical constraints, 
using it to deliver large amounts of video is questionable. 
Moreover, a recent survey conducted in five European countries proclaims that 
ex-users of streaming mobile TV services outnumber current users. The survey of 
22,000 mobile subscribers lists pricing, quality, and reliability as the most com-
mon issues causing users to switch off the services. (Tellabs 2007) 
The rationale behind building DVB-H therefore is that WCDMA or GPRS net-
works are not optimal for delivering video on the large scale, and a separate 
broadcast network is needed to enable high-quality TV services for mobile hand-
sets.  
However, we find it unlikely that DVB-H would completely replace WCDMA in 
providing multimedia streaming services, as WCDMA (and GPRS) has the ad-
vantage of being already widely deployed and able to provide video on demand 
(VoD) type of services. Quite the opposite, we expect these two forms of mobile 
TV to coexist and complement each other at least in the short term.  
Then again, from the consumer’s point of view, it should be quite irrelevant 
which technology is being used to deliver the TV shows to the mobile, as long as 
some required level of quality and ease of use is achieved. Getting both delivery 
paths under the same charge would probably be easiest for consumers. 
6.2 General outlook of DVB-H 
In Finland, commercial DVB-H services can be further delayed due to uncom-
pleted negotiations about copyright payments concerning simulcasts. One possi-
ble reason for the problem may be that copyright holders were not involved in the 
designing of the DVB-H services from the beginning. Collecting societies insist 
that DVB-T related payments do not automatically cover DVB-H transmissions, 
and broadcasters say that they will not put their channels on DVB-H if they have 
to pay any extra copyright payments for the same signal that is already available 
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to 100% of the population. As a result, at the time of writing, there is only one 
TV channel on air and there are no handsets available to the public.  
The dominant belief among interviewed experts was that simulcasts are necessary 
to bring the audiences to mobile TV and to get the handsets sold, but the actual 
value will be in pay-TV services in the future. 
Finland could have acted as an important road opener for DVB-H, but it seems 
that Italy has already set the reference case, and other markets can soon be zoom-
ing past Finland. In Italy, unlike in Finland, which follows the EU ideal of hori-
zontal operation (i.e., decoupling of networks and services), the launch was based 
on a vertical operating model. Mobile operator Hutchinson 3 Italia operates the 
DVB-H network, produces some of the offered channels, and sells the services to 
consumers. The operator reported signing up 111,000 subscribers in the first six 
weeks of operation (DVB-H Project 2007) and in total 300,000 by 1 January 
2007 (Variety 2007) - significantly less than the forecasted 500,000. 
Broadcast mobile TV game, however, was opened in Korea already in 2005 with 
satellite based S-DMB and terrestrial T-DMB technologies. The services have 
been taken up fairly well; S-DMB was reported having almost 1 million subscrib-
ers at the end of 2006, out of total 40 million Korean mobile subscribers (Tech-
world 2006). Shin (2006) however questions the mobile TV market in Korea say-
ing that its developmental momentum came mainly from an industry eager to 
come up with a new cash-cow service, and not from the consumers’ side. 
Significance of DVB-H technology 
Resembling S-DMB and T-DMB in Korea, DVB-H mobile TV is a new technol-
ogy being hyped and eagerly pushed to mobile subscribers by the mobile indus-
try. There have been DVB-H pilots in virtually all major countries in Europe, and 
Nokia as a handset manufacturer has been very active in the process. Not surpris-
ingly, in 2006 broadcast mobile TV made it to the top of Gartner’s (2006) hype 
cycle, the “peak of inflated expectations” phase before grand “disillusionment”. 
Presumably, Nokia is attempting to sell more high-end smartphones with mobile 
TV capability. However, on a larger scale, we can think of DVB-H as an exten-
sion to the GSM/WCDMA evolution from Nokia’s viewpoint; Nokia could want 
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to replicate the global success of GSM with DVB-H. There can then be much 
more at stake with DVB-H than just another mobile TV service. 
Rivalling broadcast mobile TV technologies, such as MediaFLO and T-DMB, 
originate from the North-American and Asian markets, where GSM and 
WCDMA have to compete with other cellular technologies. It may then well be 
imperative for Nokia that DVB-H would become the dominant standard in 
Europe, enabling EU-wide service availability. This would continue the GSM 
camp’s dominance in the region, and possibly help advance both technologies on 
the other continents. Even so, a common belief is that different regions will nev-
ertheless use different technologies, which has so far always been the case with 
broadcasting, as Shapiro and Varian point out (1999). 
The concept of mobile TV itself can also be seen as a small part of a broader evo-
lution of TV. The beginning of TV was about free-to-air analogue broadcasting. 
The next step was analogue cable TV and satellite TV, which enabled more 
channels and pay-TV services. The next step was to digitalise TV and to make 
more efficient use of radio spectrum and enable advanced services. Following the 
digitalisation, the current phase is about the expansion of TV to the Internet and 
mobile phones. The evolution then seems to head towards a strong diversification 
of TV access and a multitude of receivers (Arthur D. Little 2006, Kallioja 2006).  
Other considerations 
Besides the standard competition coming from USA and Asia, there is techno-
logical fragmentation even within the DVB-H camp. Different system vendors 
push incompatible digital rights management (DRM) implementations and/or 
electronic service guide (ESG) implementations. Therefore, a phone sold in 
Finland might not be able to receive DVB-H transmissions in Italy, undermining 
the prospects of a pan-European mobile TV. 
The most significant concerns should however be whether the overall value 
proposition of mobile TV is sound, and whether there really is consumer demand 
for mobile TV outside analyst reports and pilot surveys.  
Shin (2006) writes that mobile TV services in Korea may have been based pri-
marily on technical feasibility rather than market demand, and are being pushed 
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by industry and government agencies that “have a strong self-prophecy on the 
high penetration of DMB”. 
Similarly, Carlsson and Walden (2007) discuss that mobile TV as a service could 
be related to Jenson’s (2005) notion of service design by “default thinking”, a 
mindset that combines “A weak collection of axioms of design, broad market vi-
sions, or rules of execution that are not clearly articulated”. Jenson uses the dis-
appointing story of MMS as an example of such service design; the mobile indus-
try first expected MMS to be instantly successful, because SMS was popular and 
because it would be even more “cool” to send photos as well. Jenson writes that 
while there indeed appears to be an intuitive value to sending a photo, additional 
questions need be asked, such as "Do people really need this?" and "What are 
they doing in their lives where this has significant value?" In our mind, asking 
these questions is appropriate as well in the mobile TV case – or put even more 
simply, “What is the customer ‘pain’ that mobile TV is solving?” 
Moreover, in our thinking, any new form of entertainment or other information 
good will have to compete for the same limited wallets and time of consumers 
with all the existing ones: movies, TV, radio, CDs, MP3 players and other port-
able media players, newspapers, books, games, mobile Internet, and so forth. 
Therefore, reasonable pricing, availability of quality content, and ease of use can 
be vital factors for DVB-H to be attractive to consumers. 
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Appendix A: Numeric results 
The below tables list the NPV results for each operating model. Probability of 
positive NPV is the proportion of positive outcomes after 1,000 simulation runs.  
Operating model 1: MNO approach 
Results for MNO approach, simulcasts are free. 
Forecast model  Probability of  
positive NPV, % 
Mean NPV, MEUR Standard deviation  
of NPV, MEUR 
Optimistic 42.2% -1.3 6.0 
Average 3.2% -9.6  5.2  
Pessimistic 0.0% -16.8 4.1 
 
Results for MNO approach, simulcasts are not free. 
Forecast model  Probability of  
positive NPV, % 
Mean NPV, MEUR Standard deviation  
of NPV, MEUR 
Optimistic 95.6% 9.6 5.8 
Average 54.7% 0.3  4.5  
Pessimistic 0.8% -8.5 4.2 
 
Operating model 2: MVNO approach 
Results for MVNO approach, simulcasts are free. 
Forecast model  Probability of  
positive NPV, % 
Mean NPV, MEUR Standard deviation  
of NPV, MEUR 
Optimistic 0.0% -11.1 2.2 
Average 0.0% -12.6  2.3  
Pessimistic 0.0% -14.1 2.3 
 
Results for MVNO approach, simulcasts are not free. 
Forecast model  Probability of  
positive NPV, % 
Mean NPV, MEUR Standard deviation  
of NPV, MEUR 
Optimistic 7.3% -5.5 3.8 
Average 0.3% -8.9  3.5  
Pessimistic 0.0% -12.1 3.3 
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Operating model 3: Broadcaster approach (indirect) 
Results for broadcaster approach, indirect, simulcasts are free. 
Forecast model  Probability of  
positive NPV, % 
Mean NPV, MEUR Standard deviation  
of NPV, MEUR 
Optimistic 100.0% 10.3 3.8 
Average 32.6% -1.8  3.5  
Pessimistic 0.0% -13.9 3.3 
 
Results for broadcaster approach, indirect, simulcasts are not free. 
Forecast model  Probability of  
positive NPV, % 
Mean NPV, MEUR Standard deviation  
of NPV, MEUR 
Optimistic 99.7% 12.6 5.1 
Average 60.9% 1.0  4.1  
Pessimistic 0.0% -10.7 3.7 
 
Operating model 4: Broadcaster approach (direct) 
Results for broadcaster approach, direct, simulcasts are free. 
Forecast model  Probability of  
positive NPV, % 
Mean NPV, MEUR Standard deviation  
of NPV, MEUR 
Optimistic 100.0% 13.2 4.3 
Average 50.0% -0.1  3.4  
Pessimistic 0.0% -13.2 3.4 
 
Results for broadcaster approach, direct, simulcasts are not free. 
Forecast model  Probability of  
positive NPV, % 
Mean NPV, MEUR Standard deviation  
of NPV, MEUR 
Optimistic 99.9% 17.3 6.2 
Average 80.0% 3.7  4.4  
Pessimistic 0.1% -9.2 3.8 
 
Operating model 5: Pay-TV broadcaster approach (indirect) 
Results for pay-TV broadcaster approach, simulcasts are free. 
Forecast model  Probability of  
positive NPV, % 
Mean NPV, MEUR Standard deviation  
of NPV, MEUR 
Optimistic 11.6% -6.0 4.7 
Average 0.1% -11.9  3.9  
Pessimistic 0.0% -17.5 3.4 
 
Results for pay-TV broadcaster approach, simulcasts are not free. 
Forecast model  Probability of  
positive NPV, % 
Mean NPV, MEUR Standard deviation  
of NPV, MEUR 
Optimistic 54.1% 0.5 5.3 
Average 4.4% -7.7  4.5 
Pessimistic 0.0% -15.3 3.6 
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Operating model 6: Co-operation approach (MNO) 
Results for co-operation approach, MNO, simulcasts are free. 
Forecast model  Probability of  
positive NPV, % 
Mean NPV, MEUR Standard deviation  
of NPV, MEUR 
Optimistic 61.8% 0.4 2.1 
Average 18.1% -1.7  1.8  
Pessimistic 0.3% -3.7 1.7 
 
Results for co-operation approach, MNO, simulcasts are not free. 
Forecast model  Probability of  
positive NPV, % 
Mean NPV, MEUR Standard deviation  
of NPV, MEUR 
Optimistic 71.4% 1.2 2.3 
Average 33.7% -1.0  2.0  
Pessimistic 1.7% -3.3 1.9 
 
Operating model 7: Co-operation approach (MVNO) 
Results for co-operation approach, MVNO, simulcasts are free. 
Forecast model  Probability of  
positive NPV, % 
Mean NPV, MEUR Standard deviation  
of NPV, MEUR 
Optimistic 0.7% -3.5 1.7 
Average 0.0% -4.4  1.7  
Pessimistic 0.0% -5.1 1.7 
 
Results for co-operation approach, MVNO, simulcasts are not free. 
Forecast model  Probability of  
positive NPV, % 
Mean NPV, MEUR Standard deviation  
of NPV, MEUR 
Optimistic 2.1% -3.2 1.8 
Average 0.0% -4.3  1.8  
Pessimistic 0.0% -5.0 1.7 
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Appendix B: Density distribution of NPV 
The 14 figures below show the statistical density distributions of NPV results for 
each of the 42 calculation cases after 1,000 Monte Carlo simulation runs. 
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Broadcaster approach, direct (SO = Broadcaster).
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